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Principle, History, and Power: The Limits
of the First Amendment Religion Clauses
Stephen M. Feldman*
"[W]here expectations are few disappointments are rare."'

In recent years, constitutional scholars have disputed vehemently the
meanings of the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First

Amendment.2 Do the religion clauses prohibit the injection of religious
values into the so-called public square of political debate? What doctrinal

tests should courts use to determine the scope of the two clauses? 4Does
the Establishment Clause prohibit praying, moments of silence, and other

religious or quasi-religious activities in public schools? 'Does the Free
Exercise Glause require the government to grant religious exemptions
from laws of general applicability?6 Yet, regardless of the particular topical
issue, nearly all discussions of the religion clauses build upon one

* Professor of Law, University of Tulsa. I thank Steven D. Smith for his helpful
comments on an earlier draft. This essay is partially derived from a longer work-in-progress:
Please Don't Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation of Church and
State (NYU Press, forthcoming 1997). I want to acknowledge those individuals who already
have read and commented upon sections of that book and, in so doing, have contributed
(albeit indirectly) to this essay. Consequently, I thank Richard Delgado, Gary Minda, Mark
Tushnet, Tom Wartenberg, Lary Cati Backer, Lundy Langston, Marla Masfield, Nick Rostow,
Laura Feldman, and Virginia Lockman for the helpful comments. I also thank the participants
at the 1994 Mid-South Philosophy Conference for their comments on a related presentation.
Fmally, I appreciate the financial support of the Faculty Summer Research Grant Program of
the University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. Cormac McCarthy, The Crossing 406 (1994).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof ... ." U.S. Const. amend. L
3. See, e.g., RichardJ. Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square (1984); Ruti Teitel, A Critique
of Religion as Politics in the Public Sphere, 78 Cornell L Rev. 747 (1993); Symposium,
Religion in Public life: Access, Accomodation, and Accountability, 60 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 599
(1992).
4. Se, e.g., Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 Mich. L Rev. 266 (1987) (arguing against the
.no endorsement" test); Mark Tushnet, "Of Church and State and the Supreme Court":
Kurland Revisited, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 373 (defending Kurland's neutrality principle for
religion clause cases).
5. See, e.g., Symposium, Religion and the Public Schools After Lee v. Weisman, 43 Case W.
Res. L Rev. 699 (1993).
6. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U.
Chi. L Rev. 308 (1991) (defending Smith's rejection of constitutionally compelled free
exercise exemptions); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1109 (1990) (criticizing Smith).
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dominant or standard story of the separation of church and state. This oftrepeated and almost universally accepted story presents the separation of
church and state as a distinctly American constitutional principle that
simultaneously promotes democracy and protects religious freedom,
especially for religious outgroups.7
Both Steven Smith, in ForeordainedFailure: The Questfor a Constitutional
Principle of Religious Freedom" and Naomi Cohen, in Jews in Christian
America: The Pursuit of Religious Equality,9 contribute significantly to the
jurisprudence of the religion clauses by challenging this dominant story."

7. Supreme Court justices and American legal scholars long have celebrated this
dominant story of the separation of church and state. In the nineteenth century, David
Dudley Field wrote:
The greatest achievement ever made in the cause of human progress is the
total and final separation of church and state. If we had nothing else to boast of, we
could lay claim with justice that first among the nations we of this country made it
an article of organic law that the relations between man and his Maker were a
private concern, into which other men have no right to intrude.
David D. Field, American Progress, inJurisprudence 6 (1893), quoted in Leo Pfeffer, Church,
State, and Freedom ix (1953). In the late twentieth century, Stephen L Carter wrote that
"[t]he separation of church and state is one of the great gifts that American political
philosophy has presented to the world." Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief 107
(1993); see Leo Pfeffer, Church, State, and Freedom 604-05 (1953) (giving perhaps the
definitive statement of the dominant story); Philip B. Kurland, The Origins of the Religion
Clauses of the Constitution, 27 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 839, 856-57, 860 (1986) (describing the
uniqueness of the framers' goal of protecting individual religious liberty,); Sheldon H.
Nahmod, The Public Square and the Jew as Religious Other, 44 Hastings L.J. 865, 867-68
(1993) (assuming establishment clause protects Jews from governmental power that had
oppressed Jews in other nations); see also Anson P. Stokes, I Church and State in the United
States 6, 26, 37 (1950) (giving the standard story a distinctly Christian twist).
In the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court wrote:
These words [in the religion clauses] of the First Amendment reflected in the
minds of early Americans a vivid mental picture of conditions and practices which
they fervently wished to stamp out in order to preserve liberty for themselves and for
their posterity... The First Amendment has erected a wall between church and
state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8, 18 (1947). More recently, the Court reiterated"The religion clauses] are recognized as guaranteeing religious liberty and equality to 'the
infidel, the atheist, or the adherent of a non-Christian faith such as Islam or Judaism.'"
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 590 (1989) (quoting
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 US. 38, 52 (1985)).
8. Steven D. Smith, Foreordained Failure: The Quest for a Constitutional Principle of
Religious Freedom (1995).
9. Naomi W. Cohen, Jews in Christian America: The Pursuit of Religious Equality
(1992). Cohen's book already has been awarded the National Jewish Book Award in Jewish
History and the Saul Viener Prize of the American Jewish Historical Society.
10. It is worth noting that some commentators, in articulating the dominant story,
acknowledge that the framers drew upon Enlightenment political thought. The principle of
separation of church and state is then understood as a political idea spawned during the
Enlightenment but culminating in the religion clauses of the American Constitution. See, eg.,
Gerard V. Bradley, Church-State Relationships in America 122 (1987); James E. Wood, Jr. et
al., Church and State in Scripture History and Constitutional Law 57 (1958).
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RELIGION CLAUSES
Smith directly questions whether the Constitution embodies a principle of
religious freedom, while Cohen interprets the historical development of
the separation of church and state from the perspective of a prototypical
religious outgroup-American Jews." Cohen's outsider viewpoint suggests
that the religion clauses of the First Amendment have not adequately
protected American Jews through much of the nation's history. Despite the
originality and importance of each book, both Smith and Cohen ultimately
succumb to the allure of the dominant story.
Part I of this Article focuses on Smith's argument that the
Constitution does not embrace a principle of religious freedom.12 Smith's
argument tends to be highly abstract, with little attention paid to the social
and historical context of religion in America. Thus, Part II focuses on
Cohen's contextual analysis and her history of church-state relations as told
from a Jewish standpoint." Cohen's outsider perspective aptly leads her to
emphasize antisemitism, but she too complacently explores the
ramifications of her viewpoint. She overlooks the full critical potential that
the American Jewish experience provides in understanding the separation
of church and state. Part III, therefore, directly opposes the dominant story
of the separation of church and state. 4 I argue that Christianity
hegemonically controls American society and culturally oppresses outgroup
religions, particularly the prototypical minority religion of Judaism. My
specific purpose, then, is to diagnose how Christian social power operates
through the constitutional concept of separation of church and state; how
does the separation of church and state contribute to the Christian
domination of American society, including Christian cultural imperialism
over religious outgroups, particularly Jews?15

11. Books on Judaism, in general, include the following: Beryl D. Cohon, Judaism: In
Theory and Practice (1948); David C. Gross, How to Be Jewish (1989); Morris N. Kertzer,
What Is a Jew? (1953); Roy A. Rosenberg, The Concise Guide to Judaism: History, Practice,
Faith (1990); Milton Steinberg, Basic Judaism (1947). Books that focus on the differences
between Judaism and Christianity include the following Abba H. Silver, Where Judaism
Differs (1987); Trude Weiss-Rosmarin, Judaism and Christianity- The Differences (1943).
12. See infra notes 28-53 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 54-79 and accompanying text
14. See infra notes 80-222 and accompanying text.
15. My approach to power is heavily influenced by the work of Michel Foucault.
Foucault's works on power include: Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the
Prison (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) [hereinafter Foucault, Discipline and Punish]; 1 Michel
Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Robert Hurley trans., 1978) [hereinafter Foucault, History
of Sexuality]; Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, in The Foucault Reader 51 (Paul Rabinow
ed., 1984); Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in Power/Knowledge 78 (1980) [hereinafter
Foucault, Two Lectures]; Michel Foucault, How is- Power Exercised?, reprinted in Hubert L
Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault, Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 216 (2d
ed. 1983); Michel Foucault, Why Study Power: The Question of the Subject, re'rinted in
Dreyfus & Rabinow, supra at 208 [hereinafter Foucault, Why Study Power]. For an
outstanding synthesis of Foucault's work, see Dreyfus & Rabinow, supra. For an excellent
collection of essays critiquing Foucault, see Foucault A Critical Reader (David C. Hoy ed.,
1986). Some other helpful sources on understanding the postmodern concept of power
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In order to diagnose Christian social power, Part III presents a
synchronic critique of the separation of church and state. I critically
analyze how the constitutional principle of separation of church and state
contributes to the current orientation of power within American society.'r
To pursue this analysis, I approach the problem of Christian social power
from three perspectives, which correspond to the three sections of Part III.
The first section focuses on how symbolic power-especially in the form of
language-contributes to Christian hegemony; in particular, it examines
how the constitutional discourse of the Supreme Court in religion clause
cases sustains this hegemony.'7 The second section focuses on structural
power, examining how the separation of church and state relates to the
structural relations within American society."8 The third section examines
the relationshipbetween symbolic and structuralpower; this section analyzes, in
particular, how the symbolism of the separation of church and state creates
an ideology that simultaneously hides and legitimates Christian
domination." Part III gives special attention to the Supreme Court's
important religion clause decisions of the last two terms: Rosenberger v.
Rectors and Viitors of the University of irginia,20 Capitol Square Review and
include the following: Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (John B. Thompson
ed. & Gino Raymond & Matthew Adamson trans., 1991); Pierre Bourdieu & Loi C. Wacquant,
The Purpose of Reflexive Sociology, in An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology 61 (1992); John
Brenkman, Culture and Domination (1987); Nancy Fraser, Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse,
and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory (1989); Duncan Kennedy, Sexy Dressing, Etc.
(1993); Rethinking Power (Thomas E. Wartenberg ed., 1992); Jana Sawicki, Disciplining
Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the Body (1991); Thomas E. Wartenberg, The Forms of
Power (1990).
Some social and legal theorists studying subcultures, including lega-d culture, have
produced some interesting recent works on power including the following: Dick Hebdige,
Subculture: The Meaning of Style (1979); James C. Scott, Domination and the Arts of
Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (1990); Patricia Ewidc & Susan S. Silbey, Conformity,
Contestation, and Resistance: An Account of Legal Consciousness, 26 New Eng. L Rev. 731
(1992); Sally E. Merry, Culture, Power, and the Discourse of Lw, 37 N.Y.L. Sch. L Rev. 209
(1992); Susan Silbey, Making a Place for Cultural Analyses of Law, 17 Law & Soc. Inquiry 39
(1992).
16. I extensively explore the historical development of the constitutional concept of
separation of church and state in a forthcoming book. Stephen M. Feldman, Please Don't
Wish Me a Merry Christmas: A Critical History of the Separation of Church and State (NYU
Press, forthcoming 1997). 1 previously have focused on the themes of power and
postmodernism in Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power. Postmodernism in Legal
Scholarship andJudicial Practice (With an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in
Habeas Corpus Cases), 88 Nw. U. L Rev. 1046 (1994) [hereinafter Feldman, Diagnosing
Power]; Stephen M. Feldman, The Persistence of Power and the Struggle for Dialogic
Standards in Postmodern Constitutional Jurisprudence: Michelman, Habermas, and Civic
Republicanism, 81 Geo. Lj. 2243 (1993) [hereinafter Feldman, The Persistence of Power]; see
also Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, - Mich. L Rev. __
(forthcoming).
17. See infra notes 85-159 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 160-73 and accompanying text.
19. Seeinfra notes 174-222 and accompanying text.
20. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).

RELIGION CLAUSES
Advisory Board v. Pinette,2' and Board of Education of Kiyas Joel Village School

Districtv. Grumet.22
Two related points should be clarified at the outset. First, I approach
the question of power in society from a postmodern perspective.!5 Unlike
a modernist approach to power, which typically locates power in some
conscious or intentional center such as an individual, a group of
individuals, or a sovereign, a postnodernist approach underscores that

"power is everywhere and in everyone."2 4 Second, because I explore
5
Christian power in American society, I extensively discuss antisemitism.2
Throughout Western history, Jews have been victims of many forms of

21. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
22. 114 S. Ct. 2481 (1994).
23. Helpful sources on postmodemism include the following- Zygmunt Bauman,
Intimations of Postmodernity (1992); Steven Connor, Postmodernist Culture (1989);
Feminism/Postmodemism (LindaJ. Nicholson ed., 1990); David Harvey, The Condition of
Postmodernity (1989); Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late
Capitalism (1991); Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on
Knowledge (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi trans., 1984); Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi, The
Theory and Politics of Postmodernism: By Way of an Introduction, in Postmodernism and
Society 1 (Roy Boyne & Ali Rattansi eds., 1990); Stephen Crook, The End of Radical Social
Theory? Notes on Radicalism, Modernism and Postmodernism, in Postmodernism and Society,
supra, at 46.
24. Fraser, supra note 15, at 26; accordFeldman, The Persistence of Power, supra note 16,
at 2258-66; cf. Ian Hacking, The Archaeology of Foucault, in Foucault: A Critical Reader, supra
note 15, at 27, 27-36 (stating that power and knowledge are not located with specific
individuals who are in control). Modernists tend to cabin power for the sake of methodological and experimental ease: It is easier to analyze and test for power if it is supposedly centered
on some conscious agent. Se- &g., Peter Morriss, Power. A Philosophical Analysis 124-26
(1987) (describing how to test for and measure power).
25. Some books on antisemitism, in general, include the following: Hannah Arendt, The
Origins of Totalitarianism: Part One: Antisemitism (1960); Alan M. Dershowitz, Chutzpah
(1991); Edward H. Flannery, The Anguish of the Jews: Twenty-Three Centuries of AntiSemitism (rev. ed. 1985); Gavin I. Langmuir, History, Religion, and Antisemitism (1990);
Nathan Perlmutter & Ruth A. Perlmutter, The Real Anti-Semitism in America (1982); Harold
E. Quinley & Charles Y. Glock, Anti-Semitism in America (1979); Robert S. Wistrich,
Antisemitism: The Longest Hatred (1991). An excellent recent book on antisemitism in early
America is Frederic C. Jaher, A Scapegoat in the New Wilderness: The Origins and Rise of
Anti-Semitism in America (1994). A book on theJewish internalization of antisemitic attitudes
is Sander L. Gilman, Jewish Self-Hatred: A Christian Defends the Jews Against Deicide (1986).
Books that focus on the relationship between Christianity and antisemitism include the
following- Antisemitism and Foundations of Christianity (Alan Davies ed., 1979); John D.
Crossan, Who Killed Jesus? Exposing the Roots of Anti-Semitism in the Gospel Story of the
Death of Jesus (1995); Weddig Fricke, The Court-Martial of Jesus (Salvator Attanasio trans.,
1987); Jacob Neusner, Jews and Christians: The Myth of a Common Tradition (1991); William
Nicholls, Christian Antisemitism (1993); James Parkes, The Conflict of the Church and the
Synagogue (1934); James Parkes, Judaism and Christianity (1948) [hereinafter Parkes,
Judaism]; Rosemary R. Ruether, Faith and Fratricide: The Theological Roots of Anti-Semitism
(1974); Samuel Sandmel, Anti-Semitism in the New Testament? (1978). Books that focus on
the Holocaust include the following- Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust (1989);
Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews: 1933-1945 (1975); Martin Gilbert, The
Holocaust: A History of the Jews of Europe during the Second World War (1985); Raul
Hilberg, The Destruction of the European Jews (1985) (three volumes).
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overt antisemitism, from the physical violence of pogroms to the legallyenforced expulsion of Jews from many medieval European countries.'
From a postmodern standpoint, though, antisemitism cannot be limited to
such intentional or conscious anti-Jewish actions and attitudes. Instead,
antisemitism refers broadly to the intentional or unintentional, conscious
or unconscious hatred, dislike, oppression, persecution, domination, and
subjugation ofJews quaJews for whatever reason or motivation, whether it
is religious, cultural, ethnic, racial, or political. As will become evident,
Christian cultural imperialism stands as the most significant and pervasive
manifestation of antisemitism in America today.2'

I. THE PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM?
Smith initially reasons that "it is simply misleading to suppose that

26. Some helpful historical accounts of Judaism include the following. Isidore Epstein,
Judaism: A Historical Presentation (1959); PaulJohnson, A History of theJews (1987); Chaim
Potok, Wanderings (1978).
27. See Tom W. Smith, Anti-Semitism in Contemporary America, 19-22 (1994) (discussing
briefly the difficulty of empirically examining hidden, latent, and new antisemitism). While
acknowledging thatJews often were treated better in America than in other western Christian
nations, Frederic C.Jaher, a historian, details the origins and rise of antisemitism in America.
He concludes: "Christianity has a powerful anti-Semitic impulse, America is a Christian
country, and America is anti-Semitic. The truth of this syllogism has been empirically
demonstrated .... ."Jaher, supra note 25, at 249.
On the strength of Christianity in America, Steven D. Smith reports:
Upwards of 90 percent of the American population affirms some belief in the
existence of God.... [Nline persons in ten believe Jesus Christ actually lived, seven
in ten believe he was truly God, and six in ten think one must believe in the divinity
of Christ to be a Christian. The results of studies documenting consistently high
levels of belief in life after death, heaven, and Christ's presence in heaven also point
to the survival of a strong element of [religiosity] in American culture.
Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 149, 172 (1991) (quoting Robert Wuthnow, The Restructuring of American
Religion 300 (1988)). Smith adds:
Survey evidence from the 1980s. . .suggests that most of the more educated citizens
hold religious beliefs. Among college graduates in this country, only 3% say they do
not believe in God, while 77% report that their relationship with God is either
"extremely close" or "somewhat close." The percentage of college graduates who
believe in life after death (76%) is the same as that for the general population, and
the percentage of college graduates who attend church nearly every week (30%) is
slightly higher than the national average. College graduates express greater
confidence in organized religion than persons who have graduated from high school
only. And although college graduates are far less likely to be biblical literalists, 80%
believe the Bible to be the "actual word of God" or the "inspired word of God." ....
In addition, survey evidence reveals that 63% of educators regard themselves as
"religious"; the figure for individuals in vocations associated with law and justice is
53%. More than three-quarters of those in both groups attend church at least
occasionally, and over one-third attend frequently. About the same percentages
participate occasionally, or frequently, in prayer....
Smith, supra, at 174-75 (citing Unsecular America app. at 142 tbL 20 (RichardJ. Neuhaus ed.,
1986)).

RELIGION CLAUSES
there is a univocal principle of religious freedom, hovering in some
Platonic realm."28 Yet, he acknowledges that while there is no unitary
principle of religious freedom, there are many versions of or individual
opinions about religious freedom.2 Hence, to defend judicial review
under the religion clauses, constitutional scholars (and Supreme Court
justices) necessarily have attempted to specify a single version of religious
freedom embodied in the Constitution itself!s For even if there are
multiple versions or understandings of religious freedom, if only one is
contained in our Constitution, then the Supreme Court can justifiably
enforce that single constitutionalized version in judicial review. The
additional versions of religious freedom would be irrelevant to the Court's
enforcement of the religion clauses. Consequently, Smith maintains, judges
and constitutional scholars have long been asking "something like the
following question: 'What is the meaning and scope of the principle of
religious freedom embodied in the Constitution?' 3' 1
According to Smith, scholars have tried to discern the version of
religious freedom embodied in the Constitution through two different
approaches: originalism and theory.3 2 Because Smith concludes that there
is "no constitutional principle of religious freedom," s the bulk of the
book consists of Smith's attacks on each of these two approaches.34
Turning first to originalism, 5 Smith observes that many scholars argue
that the First Amendment framers articulated or intended to articulate a
principle of religious freedom. Those scholars thus analyze the history of
the drafting and adoption of the First Amendment as they attempt to glean
the principle supposedly contained within the religion clauses. In disputing
this originalist argument, Smith notes that some critics insist that
originalism never leads to determinate answers for constitutional questions.

28. Smith, supra note 8, at 11.
29. Smith writes: "[T] here is no single or self-subsisting 'principle' of religious freedom;
there is only a host of individuals with a host of different opinions and notions about how
much and what kind of scope government ought to give to the exercise of religious beliefs
and practices." Id.
30. See id. at 12-15 (discussing the unitary conception of religious freedom).
31. Id. at 6. Smith adds that, frequently, scholars either efface or fail to recognize the
variety of possible versions of religious freedom. Consequently, these scholars seek to identify
"the principle" or "the real meaning" of religious freedom instead of specifying the one
version among many that is embodied in the Constitution. Of course, in these instances, the
scholars nonetheless assert (or assume) that our Constitution embraces this singular principle
of religious freedom. Se id. at 15 (discussing scholar's unitary conception of religious
freedom).
32. See id. at 14-15 (discussing two approaches scholars use to discern the Constitution's
principle of religious freedom).
33. Smith, supra note 8, at 122.
34. Smith's argument, to some extent, resembles Nietzsche's attack on the many Western
philosophers who attempted to offer a rational foundation for morality but never questioned
the existence of morality itself. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil § 186 (Walter
Kaufmann trans., 1966).
35. See generaly Smith, supra note 8, at 15-54.
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Smith, however, suggests otherwise; in fact, he argues that an originalist
approach yields a clear answer regarding religious freedom. The First
Amendment framers, Smith argues, intended to say nothing at all about
religious freedom; instead, they intended merely to assign jurisdiction over
religious matters to the states. The religion clauses thus prohibited the
federal government from meddling in religious affairs and in so doing, the
clauses did not articulate any principle of religious freedom or liberty. The
states themselves remained unencumbered in religious matters: They were
free to prefer religion over non-religion, to favor one religion over others,
or even to establish a church. In short: "[The religion clauses] were...
simply an assignment of jurisdiction over matters of religion to the
states-no more, no less."56 Significantly, then, when the Supreme Court
eventually held that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the religion
clauses and applied them against the states, the Court repudiated the
original meaning of the First Amendment.5 7 By constitutionalizing
questions of religious freedom, the Court contravened the intentions of the
framers. 8
While some constitutional scholars, according to Smith, use an
originalist approach to explicate the supposed principle of religious
freedom embodied in the First Amendment other scholars base their
arguments on various forms of constitutional theory, such as a theory of
governmental neutrality toward religion. Smith insists, however, that
decisions regarding religious liberty are necessarily prudential and cannot
be based on any general theory of religious freedom." More important,
Smith argues that a general theory of religious freedom is impossible: Any
such theory inevitably founders on a logical conundrum.
The function of a theory of religious freedom is to mediate
among a variety of competing religious and secular positions and
interests, or to explain how government ought to deal with these
competing positions and interests. To perform that function,
however, the theory will tacitly but inevitably privilege, or prefer
in advance, one of those positions while rejecting or discounting
others. But a theory that privileges one of the competing
positions and rejects others a priori is not truly a theory of
religious freedom at all--or, at least, it is not the sort of theory
that modem
proponents of religious freedom have sought to
41
develop.
In other words, any theory of religious freedom necessarily rests upon
particular, often tacit, background beliefs or assumptions. Those

36. Smith, supra note 8, at 18.
37. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause).
38. Smith, supra note 8, at 49.
39. Id. at 57-61.
40. Id. at 55-118.
41. Id. at 63.

RELIGION CLAUSES

background beliefs or assumptions always remain controversial and are
exactly the types of assertions that the theory itself supposedly reconciles
neutrally with other competing beliefs. But of course, the theory cannot
neutrally reconcile its own assumptions with other competing beliefs
exactly because the theory rests on those very assumptions.4
Thus, based on his reading of originalist history and his argument
against a theory of religious freedom, Smith concludes that the religion
clauses do not embody any principle of religious liberty. Smith's challenge
to a component of the dominant story of separation of church and state
marks an important and welcome turn in religion clause jurisprudence.
When most constitutional scholars too readily accept that a principle of
separation of church and state promotes democracy and protects religious
freedom, Smith's argument forces us to pause. His book problematizes the
existence of such a principle by raising fundamental questions: What is the
source or foundation for the principle of separation of church and state? If
there is no such foundation, then does the principle truly exist?
Despite the significance of Smith's book, the method of his challenge
ultimately reaffirms the dominant story. Smith casts his argument
(including his anti-theory contention) almost entirely at the level of
abstract theory. Even though Smith devotes nearly half of his book to
criticizing constitutional scholars who have failed to recognize the
background assumptions of their various theories, Smith himself never
seriously questions the background assumptions of his own theoretical
argument. Smith, of course, believes that his argument can and should
persuade the reader, yet such an abstract and theoretical approach
implicitly assumes that a more persuasive theoretical argument would be
trump. Smith's belief that a more persuasive argument does not exist is
beside the point; at the pure level of theory, a stronger argument would
win. And Smith's theoretical argument, albeit elegant, does contain certain
problems. For example, Smith argues that a general theory of religious
freedom is impossible because decisions regarding religious liberty cannot
be based on theory. Simultaneously, though, he argues that originalism
reveals that there is no principle of religious freedom embodied in the
Constitution. In making this argument, Smith conveniently ignores that
originalism is nothing but one theoretical approach to understanding the
Constitution. Moreover, originalism itself is a highly controversial theory
that is not universally accepted.! Thus, the two strands of Smith's
argument-his attack on theory and his reliance on originalism-seem to

42. Id. at 68 ("The problem, simply put, is that theories of religious freedom seek to
reconcile or to mediate among competing religious and secular positions within a society, but
those competing positions disagree about the very background beliefs on which a theory of
religious freedom must rest.").
43. Se eg., John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 1-73 (1980) (criticizing various
constitutional theories, including originalism); Stephen M. Feldman, Republican Revival/Interpretive Turn, 1992 Wis. L Rev. 679, 701-14 (tracing the historical development of
different constitutional theories).
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be in tension with each other.
While Smith makes his entire argument at the level of high theory, a
stronger challenge to the dominant story of separation of church and state
could be made in a deeply contextual tone. The abstractness of Smith's
argument suggests that the questions of religious freedom and separation
of church and state in American society can be resolved by paying closer
attention to originalist history and theoretical niceties. His originalist
approach suggests that if we were to discover strong evidence of the
framers' intentions to impose a principle of religious liberty, then America
suddenly (or once again?) would have such a principle. Likewise, his
abstract anti-theory reasoning leaves the reader with the impression that if
only there were a stronger theoretical argument, then America actually
would have a constitutional principle of religious freedom. But religious
freedom and separation of church and state are matters of social reality,
not mere academic questions of originalist history and abstract theory.
To a large degree, Smith ignores the social reality of separation of
church and state. Indeed, in the final chapter of the book, Smith admits
that his argument may have been overly theoretical, so at last he attempts
to become more contextual. He writes: "Lest it seem that the [foregoing]
analysis is relevant only in a hypothetical world, it may be helpful to reflect
briefly on how the modem project of devising and implementing a
constitutional principle of religious freedom has affected the actual
American political community."4 Smith's turn to social reality leads him
to conclude that the Supreme Court's attempt to impose a principle of
religious freedom has backfired, producing political division and civil strife
revolving around religious differences. "In retrospect," Smith writes, "the
Court undertook the enforcement of principles [of separation of church
and state] calculated to avoid remote or nonexistent evils, and in doing so it
helped bring those evils into being."' Consequently, he argues that the
Court should seriously consider withdrawing from the field of religious
freedom.4 The Court then would not attempt to articulate and enforce a
principle of religious freedom or separation of church and state; instead,
the protection of 47religious freedom would be appropriately left to the
"political process."

44. Smith, supra note 8, at 115-16.
45. Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
46. Smith insists that he does not intend to surreptitiously advocate judicial withdrawal.
He writes:

So it is not as unthinkable for me as it may be for some legal scholars that the courts
perhaps should simply withdraw from the business of trying to define and protect
religious freedom. But to say that this possibility deserves serious, respectful
consideration, as the final chapter suggests, is not to advocate such a course; and in
fact I do not mean surreptitiously to advocate judicial withdrawal, as some reviewers
seem to have believed. I mean no more than the final chapter says-that the
possibility should not be regarded as beyond serious consideration.
Id.at viii.
47. Id.at 126.

RELIGION CLAUSES
Smith's belated effort to add context is not only uncritical, but also

dangerous in its superficiality. Smith too glibly dismisses the problems for
outgroup religions in a democracy when he refers to "remote or
nonexistent evils." 4' When he suggests that the political process can
protect religios freedom, he acknowledges that religious minorities might
find this approach problematic, but he again waves off these difficulties.
To be sure, leaving religious freedom to the political process has
its risks. Most obviously, unpopular religious minorities may have
little power in the political process. On the other hand, it is
arguable that the political process is more responsive to religious
freedom concerns than the courts have been.... [E]xperience
suggests that a judicial withdrawal from the field might not
detract from, and indeed might amount to a net gain for,
religious freedom.49
In the end, somewhat surprisingly, Smith further re-enacts the dominant
story by suggesting that, before the Supreme Court intervened in the
1940s, America already had a principle (or principles) of religious freedom
"constitutive" of our political community.
Unfortunately, Smith's contextual argument seems to be based more
on abstract conjecture than on historical knowledge and analysis. The
social reality of separation of church and state is highly complex; it can be
reduced neither to offhand suggestions that religious outgroups would be
freer without judicial protection (as Smith suggests) nor to celebratory
declarations of the American victory over religious oppression (as the
dominant story suggests). Thus, to be sure, although I criticize Smith, I do
not intend to reassert the dominant story: I am not suggesting that there
exists an abstract principle of separation of church and state that
simultaneously protects democracy and promotes religious liberty,
especially for outgroup religions. Rather, I advocate taking a more
nuanced contextual approach to constitutional principle-one more
reflective of social reality and the orientations of power within society.
Such an approach, in some instances, might critically alter our
understanding of doctrine and history. For example, Smith argues that
recent Supreme Court decisions have strongly "contributed to the political
mobilization of the religious Right,"5 but he ignores the substantial
history showing that Christian activists and evangelicals have sought
periodically throughout American history to use various methods,2
including the political process, to impose Christian practices and beliefs.

48. Id. at 117.
49. Smith, supra note 8, at 126.
50. Id. at 123-24. Smith argues that this principle or principles would be derived from
tradition, would be narrower than the common scholarly conception of the constitutional
principle of religious freedom, and would not support judicial review.
51. Id. at 117.
52. See, e.g., Robert T. Handy, A Christian America (2d ed. 1984); Martin E. Marty,
Protestantism in the United States: Righteous Empire (2d ed. 1986).
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In another instance, Smith argues that the framers did not resolve issues
regarding religious freedom and separation of church and state because
these were "some of the most difficult and divisive issues likely to arise in a
diverse political community."53 Contrary to Smith's assertion, however,
insofar as the framers did not resolve these issues, it was more because of
consensus and homogeneity than divisiveness and diversity. The nation of the
framers' generation was so completely Christian (Protestant) that the
primary issue-that this was a Christian nation-was undisputed and
needed no further resolution. Secondary matters related to the
enforcement and following of Christianity could have, however, generated
disagreement and hence were not worth discussing-exactly because the
Christian nature of America was already so deeply entrenched. But if
Smith's book ultimately falters because of its inadequate attention to social
context of this sort, then Naomi Cohen's book provides at least a partial
remedy. Cohen richly details the historical development of the separation
of church and state in American society from the perspective of an
archetypal religious outgroup-American Jews.

II. AMERICAN JEWS AND THE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
As Cohen recounts the history of the separation of church and state
from the perspective of American Jews, the notion that this nation has
enforced a principle of religious freedom or equality since the late
eighteenth or even the late nineteenth century seems perilously naive.
Cohen describes a nation that from its inception, was ridden by Christian
cultural imperialism and rife with antisemitism both inside and outside of
government. Starting in colonial times, Cohen notes, Christianity was "the
national public religion."f The Revolution and the era of constitution
writing, including the federal and many state constitutions, did not change
this social reality. After the Revolution, nine state constitutions mentioned
Christianity and its teachings, and two other states continued to function
well into the nineteenth century under explicitly pro-Christian colonial
charters.r5 Early in the nineteenth century, most states still demanded that
governmental officeholders subscribe to Christian oaths, and even when
state constitutions supposedly protected freedom of conscience, statutory
laws often imposed disabilities on religious outgroups.! Cohen explains

53. Smith, supra note 8, at 119.
54. Cohen, supra note 9, at 3; cf Jaher, supra note 25, at 82-113 (describing the
development of antisemitism in the American colonies).
55. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 23; cfJaher, supra note 25, at 112-13 (explaining that the
American Revolution and the Constitution did not significantly change life for American

Jews).
56. There were so few Jews in America during the colonial times and the early years of
the nation that the first legislative focus on Jewish rights did not arise until around 1818 in the
debate over the so-called "Jew Bill." This bill would have eliminated Maryland's Christian oath
barring Jews from office. Significantly, Christian supporters of the bill seemed more
concerned with New Testament doctrine, asserting thatJews could not be fcced to convert,
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the occasional divergence between state constitutions and statutes in the
following manner:
[This fact is] best explained by fundamental, popular assumptions
on the subject of religion in society. In the first place, Americans
believed that-whether written into the constitutions or
not-theirs was a Christian if not a Protestant nation.
Furthermore, all good citizens agreed that the state was obligated
to encourage religion, the base on which civic virtue and
successful republican government rested. Freedom of religion
hardly translated to freedom from religion or into equal
57
encouragement of non-Christians or non-Protestants.
In this already hegemonic Christian context, the Second Great
Awakening erupted during the early nineteenth century, spreading
evangelical Protestantism across America.: As Cohen notes, although the
Protestant evangelical activists claimed to seek voluntary conversions to and
reaffirmations of Christianity, the line between voluntarism and coercion
often blurred.
Affirmations of voluntarism projected the image of a situation
more open than the one which actually obtained. In the first
place, the religions causes of the first half of the nineteenth
century fed upon fixed customs and laws bequeathed by the early
settlers on subjects like Sunday observance, blasphemy, and
religious instruction in the schools. Americans were historically
and in fact a homogeneous Protestant people; the task of the
churches was to breathe new life into Christian roots already
embedded, to create not a Christian nation but a more religious
Christian nation. 9
America already had been a Christian nation, now it just became
more so. Governmental actions repeatedly affirmed the significance of
Christianity. For example, state governments incorporated Christian
°
associations devoted to the organized proselytization of American Jews,6
while the federal government negotiated treaties that protected only
Christians. 61 Throughout the nineteenth century (and indeed, into the
twentieth), judges assumed that Christianity was part of the common
law.62 For instance, Sunday Blue Laws originated in this Christian-derived

than with achieving equality for Jews. Cohen, supra note 9, at 40-42.
57. Id. at 28.
58. Cohen calls the Second Great Awakening a "rude awakening" for Jews. Id. at 37-38.
For discussions of the Second Great Awakening, see Handy, supra note 52, at 24-56; Nathan
0. Hatch, The Democratization of American Christianity (1989); Winthrop S. Hudson &John
Corrigan, Religion in America 133-38 (5th ed. 1992); Marty, supra note 52, at 45-62.
59. Cohen, supra note 9, at 38.
60. For instance, the American Society for Meliorating the Condition of the Jews
(ASMCJ) was incorporated in 1820. Id. at 39.
61. For instance, in 1850, the federal government negotiated a commercial treaty with
Switzerland containing the following provision: "Christians alone are entitled to the enjoyment
of privileges guaranteed by the present Article in the Swiss Cantons." Id. at 53. In 1860,
America entered a treaty with China that singled out Christians for protection. Id at 55.
62. See id. at 55-56 (surveying the ties between religion and nineteenth century common
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common law. In one case, a state court rather typically upheld the
conviction of a Jew for selling gloves on Sunday, but the court then
gratuitously added that religious freedom was due to Christian mercy and
love.6 Rabbi Isaac Leeser, the editor of The Occident, an antebellum Jewish
periodical, observed: "We have our theoretical rights, but practically they
are dependent on the will of those who have numbers on their side; and if
we make all the noise in the world, and brag aloud after our heart's
content, we are yet strangers in stranger lands."" In 1853, The Occident
speculated that if the Constitution had been written at that time, American
Jews probably would have been expressly denied civil rights.6
During the latter part of the nineteenth century, many Christian
Americans feared that immigration, industrialization, and secularization
were undermining the Christian nature of the nation. Consequently,
various movements crystallized to help fortify Christianity as the American
religion. In the 1860s, the National Association to Secure the Religious
Amendment to the Constitution, claiming to uphold freedom of
conscience and separation of church and state, spearheaded a national
movement to amend the preamble of the Constitution as follows: "We, the
people of the United States, humbly [acknowledge] Almighty God as the
source of all authority and power in civil government, the Lord Jesus
Christ as the Ruler among the nations, his revealed will as the supreme law
of the land, in order to constitute a Christian government...."6
Meanwhile, the National Reform Association (NRA) pushed for anti-liquor
laws, Protestant Bible reading in public schools (which already was a fact of
life), and the enforcement of Sunday Blue Laws to symbolically underscore
thatJesus Christ was "the nation's ruler." 7 Lest one assume that the NRA
was a reactionary fringe group, Cohen notes that its president, William
Strong, was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1 8 7 0 .68
Remarkably, the first part of the twentieth century brought even greater
antisemitism. Jews were faced with constant economic and social
discrimination and occasional street violence.6 9 Henry Ford accused the
"Bolshevik Jew" of conspiring to overthrow the Christian nation, and

law).
63.

See id. at 61-62 (citing City Council of Charleston v. Benjamin (1846)).

64. Cohen, supra note 9, at 54.
65.

See id. at 39; cf.Jaher, supra note 25, at 114-69 (discussing often underestimated but

extensive antisemitism in the early Republic until 1840).
66. Cohen, supra note 9, at 66 (quoting the sponsors of the movement called the
National Association to secure the Religious Amendment to the Constitution).
67. Id. at 72.
68. See id. at 69. For further discussion of American antisemitism during the latter part of
the nineteenth century, see Benjamin Ginsberg, The Fatal Embrace: Jews and the State 59-91
(1993); Jaher, supra note 25, at 170-241 (emphasizing that already prevalent antisemitism
intensified during the latter part of the nineteenth century).
69. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 93 (summarizing early twentieth century history ofJewish
discrimination). Benjamin Ginsberg considers the 1920s to be, perhaps, the most overtly
antisemitic period in American history. Ginsberg, supra note 68, at 96.
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Prohibition was hailed as "a striking victory for the advance of Christian
civilization."70 In 1905, Supreme CourtJustice David Brewer gave a series
of lectures explaining why America was and would remain a Christian
nation.7' Antisemitism as a form of racism intensified: The 1903 and 1907
Immigration Laws required that the country of origin be specified for each
immigrant, except Jews who were designated as Hebrews (this practice
continued into the 1930s). 2 Tens of thousands of Jews were arrested for
violating Sunday Blue Laws75 and between the World Wars, the movement
to mandate Bible reading in the public schools became yet more
determined. "By 1941 twelve states and the District of Columbia required
Bible reading, seven states permitted it, eleven prohibited it, and eighteen
made it optional."7 4 Rabbi Arthur Gilbert described the dire consequences for Jews who protested the Christianizing in the public schools: "'Jewish
parents... endured cross burnings on their lawns, harassing phone calls,
the threat of economic boycott, and the mass distribution of anti-Semitic
hate literature.' 7 5
I have mentioned only a few of the many events and developments
that Cohen extensively details as she implicitly challenges the dominant
story of church and state. The dominant story assumes that religious liberty
has triumphed in America, but Cohen brilliantly links the development of
American antisemitism and religious oppression to the story of the
separation of church and state. She underscores that religious freedom and
church-state relations are social issues best understood in historical context.
Quite dearly, through at least the mid-1940s, any celebratory declarations
of broad religious freedom and equality for American Jews ring hollow.
Consequently, if we view Cohen and Smith together and recall that Smith
ultimately recommended that we seriously consider judicial withdrawal
from the field of religious freedom, then Cohen's historical narrative
should cause us at least to contemplate rejecting this possibility (assuming
it is a real possibility). Despite Smith's claim that judicial withdrawal might
generate a "net gain" in religious freedom, 7 6 the history of antisemitism
before World War II, and hence before the Court's heavy involvement in
religious affairs, suggests that American Jews and other non-Christian
religious outgroups probably will not realize any such gain.
Nonetheless, like Smith, Cohen also ultimately reaffirms the dominant
story. A major theme for Cohen is the Jewish contribution to the
development of religion clause jurisprudence. She maintains that from
early in the nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century, Jews
(with occasional support from liberal Christians) have been primarily

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Cohen, supra note 9, at 95-94.
Id. at 100-01 (citing DavidJ. Brewer, The United States a Christian Nation (1905)).
Cohen, supra note 9, at 94-99.
Id. at 110-11.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 138 (quoting Arthur Gilbert, Ajew in Christian America 137 (1966)).
Smith, supra note 8, at 126.
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responsible for the development of the principle of separation of church
and state." Furthermore, she argues that after World War II, it was Jewish
litigation in the Supreme Court that led to the eventual triumph of
religious freedom and separation of church and state. And to Cohen,
because of the triumph of religious freedom, American antisemitism
effectively disappeared in the postwar era; "[a]fter 1965," she writes,
"Christianity was no longer synonymous with public religion... . 78
Indeed, the second half of Cohen's book describes the postwar victory of
religious freedom and the Jewish contribution to it by recounting
numerous Supreme Court religion clause decisions, many of which
involved one or more of the three largest Jewish defense agencies: the
American Jewish Committee, the Anti-Defamation League, and the
American Jewish Congress." Consequently, Cohen re-enacts the dominant
story in two ways. First, she argues that a principle of religious freedom
and separation of church and state has triumphed in America; she merely
defers the time of victory until the 1960s. Second, Cohen argues that the
development and triumph of the separation of church and state was due
largely to the strong advocacy of the Jewish defense agencies. In making
this argument, Cohen leaves us with the impression that separation of
church and state necessarily protects religious outgroups.
III. CHRISTIANITy, POWER, AND AMERICAN SOCIEY

This Part challenges these two aspects of Cohen's argument by
presenting a synchronic critique of the separation of church and state in
postwar America. Cohen adroitly used the distance of history to facilitate
her critique of the separation of church and state in America before World
War II, but then she too easily accepted the dominant story of church and
state in the more recent postwar era. Thus, I seek to analyze critically how
the constitutional principle of separation of church and state contributes
to the current orientation of power within American society. My
postmodem approach to the question of power in sodety 0 facilitates a
challenge to Cohen's final conclusions, and it also stands somewhat
opposed to Smith's argument. As already discussed, Smith argues that any
theory of religious freedom necessarily fails because all such theories must
be based on background beliefs or tacit assumptions. Smith, however, does
not acknowledge that this type of argument is standard postmodemist fare:
The notion that all theory--in fact, all communication and understand77. Se, e.g., Cohen, supra note 9, at 12-930 (describing the activities of the American
Jewish Committee, Anti-Defamation League, and American Jewish Congress and their links
with Christian liberals).
78. Id. at 244. Similarly, Cohen adds: "By [the mid-1960s]... Christianity had lost its
place as the public religion of the nation and most of the major issues that had troubled
American Jews since the nineteenth century had been resolved." Id. at viL
79. See Cohen, supra note 9, at 131-239 (discussing cases involving church-state issues that
reached the Supreme Court between 1948 and 1963).
80. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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ing-arises from one's current horizon of cultural prejudices and interests
would hardly surprise anyone familiar with postmodernism s1 Smith,
though, insists that he does not wish to become embroiled in larger
jurisprudential controversies regarding theory; he merely wants to critique
the jurisprudence of the religion clauses."" Smith's hesitancy here is
understandable: the status of theory in postmodernism represents a
veritable (postmodern) bramble bush.83
Yet, at the same time, Smith's decision to bracket (or ignore) the
larger jurisprudential issues regarding postmodernism and theory skews the
conclusion of his theoretical argument. On the one hand, if Smith
correctly concludes that there is no solid basis for a principle of religious
liberty, but nonetheless there are many other valid constitutionalpriniples, then
he would be apt to reach (and, in fact, does reach) the conclusion that
courts should no longer attempt to enforce a principle of religious liberty.
On the other hand, there is no solid basis for a principle of religious
liberty (as Smith concludes) and also there are no other valid constitutional
prindpes (because postiuodem insights undermine the traditional
conception of constitutional principles), then one might reach a very
different conclusion. For example, one might conclude that the concept of
constitutional principles needs to be completely rethought or, perhaps,
that a coherent abstract constitutional principle is unnecessary to the
practical or pragmatic enforcement of general norms. Smith, however,
precludes considering these alternatives because he assumes that the thrust
of his argument can be limited readily to a critique of the principle of
religious liberty.
In a sense, Smith wants to take a postmodern insight-that theory
always is based on background beliefs or tacit assumptions-and relegate it
to the lawyer's toolbox, as if it were merely another modernist tool helpful
in constructing legal arguments. 4 But postmodern insights are not new
modernist instruments that can be taken out occasionally and then put
safely away. Smith's attempt to do so facilitates his politically conservative,
albeit qualified, suggestion that the Court should refuse to attempt to
enforce a principle of religious freedom. But by bracketing the more
general postmodern critique of theory, Smith sidesteps the potentially
radical postmodern political implications for constitutional jurisprudence.
Smith's argument, then, is not necessarily wrong; it just does not go far
enough to explore the full potential of its critical perspective. Hence, this
Part examines the constitutional principle of separation of church and

81. See Feldman, The Persistence of Power, supra note 16, at 2258-66 (emphasizing that
the enabling and distortive effects of power are always present).
82. Smith, supra note 8, at 60-61.
83. See generally Karl Llewellyn, The Bramble Bush (1930) (comparing the study of law to
getting caught in a bramble bush).
84. See Stephen M. Feldman, Exposing Sunstein's Naked Preferences, 1989 Duke L.J.
1335, 1347-48 (explaining that Cass Sunstein used a postmodern insight as if it were a tool in
the lawyer's toolbox).
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state from a more thoroughly posrnodern perspective.
A. Symbolic Power
Symbolism should be understood as a technique for or a means of
implementing power and, simultaneously, as a consequence or effect of
power."$ The most pervasive type of symbolism is language.$ In one way,
language represents a technique of power because words directly and
indirectly implement power. Some words, such as those constituting a
promise or a threat, amount to performative acts, while other words trigger
certain feelings, actions, or both in the interpreter who hears or reads the
words.0 For example, particular words can trigger specific coercive and
violent social actions or practices: The legal discourse denying a petition
for habeas corpus can lead to a capital defendant's execution. Yet, in a
second way, language looms as an even more direct means of implementing power. As Michel Foucault says: "Discourse transmits and produces
power.""8 Our "distinct ways of talking about and interpreting events" "
constitute the shape of our very being-in-the-world.90 The conceptual
85. See Bourdieu, supra note 15, at 38, 77, 166, 170 (stating that language is a means of
communication and a medium of power). Foucault writes that "in any society, there are
manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise and constitute the social body, and
these relations of power cannot themselves be established, consolidated nor implemented
without the production, accumulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse." Foucault,
Two Lectures, supra note 15, at 93.
86. Another type of symbolic power is art. Bourdieu, supra note 15, at 164.
87. In Austinlan terms, utterances (or speech acts) are performatives because they have
illocutionary and perlocutionary force. Illocutionary force arises from an act done in
uttering-for example, a promise or a threat. Perlocutionary force arises when an utterance
has an effect on others-for example, embarrassment or fright. J.L Austin, PerformativeConstative, in The Philosophy of Language 13 (John Searle ed., 1971); John Searle,
Introduction, in The Philosophy of Language, supra, at 1.
88. Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 15, at 101. Foucault adds: "Discourse
reinforces power, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible
to thwart it." Id. Richard Bernstein writes: "[Foucault] is always showing us how discursive
practices exclude, marginalize, and limit us." Richard J. Bernstein, Foucault Critique as a
Philosophic Ethos, in The New Constellation 142, 160 (1991). Critical race theorists also
emphasize the significant power of speech. For example, Charles Lawrence writes: "[R]acist
speech constructs the social reality that constrains the liberty of non-whites because of their
race." Charles R. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus,
1990 Duke UJ. 431, 444; cf PatriciaJ. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 61 (1991)
(stating that the legacy of slavery and Jim Crow exists in the "powerful and invisibly
reinforcing structures of thought, language, and law").
89. Merry, supra note 15, at 217-18.
90. To be clear, I do not mean to suggest that all words or forms of language are equally
constraining or coercive. Without suggesting that words have force totally apart from the
context of their use, we can still recognize that different linguistic practices may be more
coercive and violent than others. For example, hate speech is usually more violent and
harmful than saying, "Hello." See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound- A Tort Action For
Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 133, 157 (1982) (arguing
for an independent tort to provide relief for victims of racial insults); Marl Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320, 2376
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distinctions and criteria of legitimation embedded in our discursive
practices shape our understandings and perceptions of social events and
reality.9' Hence, in this second way, language appears as a technique of
power because it helps to produce and reproduce meaning and, thus,
social reality. 2
The philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer elucidates
this power of language.9 ' Gadamer explains that our prejudices and
interests, derived from communal traditions (including the culture and
history of our community), simultaneously enable and constrain
understanding and interpretation.94 Prejudices and interests open us to

(1989) (arguing that the viewpoint of the intended victim of racial slurs should be taken into
consideration when formulating a response to hate speech). But cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance punishing hate speech).
Moreover, different linguistic practices are associated with different social practices, some of
which are more coercive and violent than others. For example, the Supreme Court's linguistic
practices sometimes are associated with social practices-such as capital punishment-that are
of the more violent variety.
91. Linda Nicholson writes: "[C]onceptual distinctions, criteria of legitimation, cognitive
procedural rules, and so forth are all political and therefore represent moves of power
[though] they represent a different type of power than is exhibited in, for example, physical
violence or the threat of force." Linda J. Nicholson, Introduction, in Feminism/Postmodernism, supra note 23, at 1, 11.
Thomas Wartenberg writes:
Power, in the form of discursive influence, can take place at the most basic level of
the constitution of a human being's understanding of the world, it need not be
limited to the restructuring of options already given to an agent. Such domination
works by first making social agents aware of the options that they face as having a
certain character. It is a use of power, since it affects an agent's understanding of his
action-environment; but it is not interventional, because it does not so much
restructure an agent's action-environment as constitute his awareness of it in the first
place.
Wartenberg, supra note 15, at 135.
92. Adam Thurschwell focuses on two forms of violence inherent to legal discourse:
direct violence triggered by legal rhetoric, and the destruction of meaning. Adam
Thurschwell, Reading the Law, in The Rhetoric of Law 275 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns
eds., 1994). Duncan Kennedy writes: "The stage for the play of signifiers is sometimes a killing
field." Kennedy, supra note 15, at 181. The legal theorist who, perhaps, has most dearly
focused on the violence of language is Robert Cover. See, eg., Robert M. Cover, Foreword:
Nomos and Narrative, 97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1983); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95
Yale LJ. 1601 (1986).
93. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall
trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989); see Feldman, Diagnosing Power, supra note 16, at 1060-65 (describing
Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics); Stephen M. Feldman, The New Metaphysics: The
Interpretive Turn in Jurisprudence, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 661, 681-90 (1991) (discussing Gadamer's
philosophical hermeneutics and its relation to jurisprudence).
94. With regard to how prejudices enable understanding, Gadamer writes: "[Tihe
historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute
the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our
openness to the world." Hans-Georg Gadamer, The Universality of the Hermeneutical
Problem, inJosef Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics 133 (1980) [hereinafter Gadamer,
The Universality]. Stanley Fish writes similarly that "already-in-place interpretive constructs are
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the possibility of understanding; without prejudices and interests,
understanding and communication are impossible. At the same time, our
prejudices and interests necessarily constrain and direct our understanding
and communication. One's life within a community and its cultural
traditions always limits or "distorts" one's range of vision-what one can
possibly perceive or understand."- In short, we can never step outside the
horizon of our prejudices and interests to find some firmer foundation for
understanding. 9 Moreover, according to Gadamer, language is the
"medium"7 of tradition and understanding- "Language is the fundamental mode of operation of our being-in-the-world and the all embracing
form of the constitution of the world." 98 Hence, from a Gadamerian
perspective, language (as tradition) appears as a technique of power
insofar as it enables and constrains (or produces and limits) understanding
and meaning (and hence social reality).
Simultaneously, though, language appears as a consequence or effect
of power. According to Gadamer, we are historical beings who live in
tradition, just as we live in a community. Tradition is not a thing of the
past; it is something in which we constantly participate. 9 We continuously
constitute and reconstitute our tradition and hence our language as we
engage in dialogical understanding.o° The use of a language is recursive;
language reproduces itself.'O' In sum, language can be understood as

a condition of consciousness." Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 Yale

LJ. 1773, 1795 (1987).
95. See Stanley Fish, Critical Self-Consciousness, Or Can We Know What VWe're Doing?, in
Doing What Comes Naturally 436, 450-55 (1989) (arguing that by becoming antifoundational,
one does not escape the implications of antifoundationalism). Gadamer writes:
This formulation certainly does not mean that we are enclosed within a wall of
prejudices and only let through the narrow portals those things that can produce a
pass saying, "Nothing new will be said here." Instead we welcome just that guest who
promises something new to our curiosity. But how do we imow the guest whom we
admit is one who has something new to say to us? Is not our expectation and our
readiness to hear the new also necessarily determined by the old that has already
taken possession of us?
Gadamer, The Universality, supra note 92, at 133.
96. Gadamer uses the metaphor of the "horizon" to communicate the notion that one's
possibilities for understanding are limited. The horizon is "the range of vision that includes
everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point." Gadamer, supra note 91, at 302.
97. Id. at 384.
98. Gadamer, The Universality, supra note 94, at 128, 136-S7.
99. Gadamer writes: 'Tradition is not simply a permanent precondition; rather, we
produce it ourselves inasmuch as we understand, participate in the evolution of tradition, and
hence further determine it ourselves." Gadamer, supra note 93, at 293. Steven L Winter
writes: "Every actual self begins as part of a community that it does not choose and cannot
escape...." Steven L. Winter, Contingency and Community in Normative Practice, 139 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 963, 987 (1991).
100. See James B. White, When Words Lose Their Meaning (1984); James B. White,
Judicial Criticism, 20 Ca. L. Rev. 835, 867 (1986) (discussing the way lawyers and judges
remake language).
101, Cf Anthony Giddens, Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory 10 (1982) (stating social

RELIGION CLAUSES
both a technique and an effect of power because as language helps
(re)produce meaning and10 2social reality, language itself is part of the
(re)produced social reality.
Within any large society, different cultures or subcultures have their
own distinctive (though often overlapping) languages. Different
(sub)cultures therefore offer contrasting discursive interpretations of social
events and reality (or, in effect, different social realities). There is, in short,
a struggle between discourses.' s Cultural imperialism arises when one
discourse or culture manages to dominate another. And when one culture
emerges to thoroughly dominate the competing (sub)cultures, then that
dominant culture exercises hegemonic power. The dominant culture so
completely controls the understanding of social events and reality that its
understanding becomes the normal, the neutral, and the natural.0' As
Dick Hebdige declares, the dominant culture tends "to masquerade as
nature."0 5 The contingent assumptions and interpretations of the
dominant culture become tacit, invisible, or appear as mere common
sense; they become so neatly woven into the social fabric that they no
longer are understood as cultural or as manifestations of power.' 6 In

structuration is recursive because structure is both the medium and the outcome of the
practices it organizes); Niklas Lulhmann, Operational Closure and Structural Coupling. The
Differentiation of the Legal System, 13 Cardozo L Rev. 1419, 1422-84 (1992) (arguing the
social theory of autopoiesis focuses attention on communication as a central operation in the
reproduction of the legal system).
102. To be dear, language alone neither produces nor amounts to social reality. Contrary
to that idealistic notion, linguistic or symbolic practices always remain entwined with material
practices and social structures (such as the division of labor). Cf Feldman, The Persistence of
Power, supra note 16, at 2258-61 (criticizing Habermas's argument that we can separate
symbolic reproduction in a lifeworld from material reproduction). Thus, we might understand
language and tradition as being, in the words of Julia Annas, "socially embodied" or
"embodied in various forms of social life." Julia Annas, MacIntyre on Traditions, 18 Phil. &
Pub. Aff. 388, 388-89 (1989) (discussing Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of tradition).

103. James Scott writes:
[I]t is clear that the frontier between the public [transcript of a dominant group]
and the hidden [transcript of an oppressed group] is a zone of constant struggle
between dominant and subordinate-not a solid wall. The capacity of dominant
groups to prevail-though never totally-in defining and constituting what counts as
the public transcript and what as offstage is... no small measure of their power.
The unremitting struggle over such boundaries is perhaps the most vital arena for
ordinary conflict...
Scott, supra note 15, at 14.
104. "Feminist scholars have demonstrated again and again that authoritative views

purporting to be neutral and disinterested actually express the partial and interested
perspectives of dominant social groups." Fraser, supra note 15, at 181.
105. Hebdige, supra note 15, at 102.
106.

Barry Smart writes:

Hegemony contributes to or constitutes a form of social cohesion not through
force or coercion, nor necessarily through consent, but most effectively by way of
practices, techniques, and methods which infiltrate minds and bodies, cultural
practices which cultivate, behaviours and beliefs, tastes, desires, and needs as
seemingly naturally occurring qualities and properties embodied in the psychic and
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short, power hides behind its own productions."7
As discussed, we constantly constitute and reconstitute our
traditions!0
Cultural traditions, therefore, are neither static nor
permanent. Gadamer writes: "Even the most genuine and pure tradition
does not persist because of the inertia of what once existed. It needs to be
affirmed, embraced, cultivated." '0 Like any cultural tradition a dominant
and imperialistic culture must constantly be reproduced and sustained."0
For that reason, subcultural discourses or interpretations of reality
represent "oppositional readings,""' deviant threats to the complex web
of meanings enforced by the dominant culture. 2 For the dominant
culture to maintain its position, it must neutralize or subdue any such
threats. One common technique for subduing a subcultural discourse is
the redefinition of the subculture-the redefinition of the "Other."" s This
redefinition can occur in at least two different ways." 4 First, the
differences between the dominant culture and subculture can be denied.
That is, the difference of the Other is denied; the Other becomes the
Same."5 The distinct elements of the subculture are ignored or obscured
as the dominant culture imperialistically absorbs the subordinate
group."5 Second, the dominant culture can actively exclude and objectify

physical reality (or "truth") of the human subject.
Barry Smart, The Politics of Truth and the Problem of Hegemony, in Foucault: A Critical
Reader, supra note 15, at 157, 160; cf Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Cultural Writings
104-07 (1985) (stating that multiple social forces contribute to produce hegemony), repinted
in An Antonio Gramsci Reader:. Selected Writings, 1916-1935, at 194-95 (David Forgacs ed.,
1988).
107. Dick Hebdige writes: "The struggle between different discourses, different definitions
and meanings within ideology is therefore always, at the same time, a struggle within
signification: a struggle for possession of the sign which extends to even the most mundane
areas of everyday life." Hebdige, supra note 15, at 17.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99 (discussing how we continuously constitute
and reconstitute our tradition and language).
109. Gadamer, supra note 93, at 281.
110. See Hebdige, supra note 15, at 16 (arguing that even hegemonic cultures must be
sustained).
111. Id.at 102.
112. id.at 17.
113. My conception of the "Other" is heavily influenced by Derridean deconstruction. Se,
e.g., Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology 31, 47, 62 (Gayatri C. Spivak trans., 1976); Jacques
Derrida, Positions (Alan Bass trans., 1981); Jacques Derrida, Differance, in Margins of
Philosophy 3 (Alan Bass trans., 1982); Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The "Mystical
Foundation of Authority," 11 Cardozo L Rev. 919 (1990).
114. See Hebdige, supra note 15, at 94-99. Another technique for subduing the subcultural
discourse is to co-opt the subcultural signs by converting them into marketable and massproduced commodities. Id.
115. See ld.; cf.Roy Boyne, Foucault and Derrida. The Other Side of Reason 124 (1990)
(pointing out two responses to difference: exclusion, and neutralization and incorporation).
116. In his discussion of Levinas, Richard Bernstein suggests that "the primary thrust of
Western tradition has always been to reduce, absorb, or appropriate what is taken to be 'the
Other' to 'the Same.'" Richard J. Bernstein, Incommensurability and Otherness Revisited, in
The New Constellation, supra note 88, at 57, 68.

RELIGION CLAUSES
the members of the subcultural group."7 With this latter form of
redefinition, the dominant group may acknowledge the differences of the
subculture, but those differences now establish the inferiority of the
subcultural group."" In short, the dominant culture defines difference
from itself as inferiority. In many instances, the dominant culture consigns
the members of the subcultural group to a position beyond common
decency, sometimes outside of humanity itself. From the perspective of
members of the dominant culture, such objectification can seem to justify
the most heinous emotional and physical abuses of the subcultural
members. Most important, with either form of redefinition-denial of
difference, or exclusion and objectification-the dominant culture
attempts to define the subculture itself. The struggle between the dominant
and subcultural discourses encompasses the very being and social identity
of the subcultural group and its members.
This viewpoint reveals partly how Christian cultural domination has
historically produced antisemitism. For most of the last two millennia,
Christians have maintained a position of hegemonic domination in
Western society in part by implementing both forms of redefinition to
To some extent, the
subdue the threat of a Jewish subculture.'
difference between Christianity and Judaism lies in the meaning attributed
to the life and death of Jesus.' 20 To Christians, but not to Jews, Jesus was
the Messiah and the Son of God. Consequently, the New Testament,'2 ' as
Christian discourse, seeks to subdue the threat of the Jewish counterdiscourse-the Jewish refusal to accept the Christian meaning ofJesus. For
example, the New Testament denies the Jewish difference by appropriating
Jewish history and the Hebrew Bible (literally renamed as the Old
Testament) to support the Christian interpretation of reality (the coming
of Jesus as the Messiah). After Jesus' death, his followers or disciples
searched the Hebrew Bible for historical passages which they could

117. Boyne, supra note 115, at 124; Hebdige, supra note 15, at 94-99.
118. See Drucilla Cornell, Beyond Accommodation: Ethical Feminism, Deconstruction, and
the Law 136 (1991) (criticizing the notion that the feminine identity has an inherent
normative perspective). Social psychologists suggest that, in a workplace, if an individual
belongs to a group that constitutes less than 15-20% of the workforce, then the individual
becomes highly visible and likely to be viewed and evaluated according to stereotypes. See
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-03 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (explaining
how minority groups in the workplace are evaluated using stereotypes); Hopkins v. Price
Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117-18 (D.D.C. 1985), affd in rdevantpar 825 F.2d 458,467
(D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (recognizing the value of
testimony regarding sexual stereotypes in the workplace).
119. Religious discourse is one of the most significant means for producing meaning and
social reality. Its significance is magnified, moreover, because it denies the meaning-producing
role of humans in society. Peter L. Berger, The Sacred Canopy 100-01 (1967).
120. This definition of difference is itself oriented toward Christianity. That is, from a
Jewish perspective unconcerned with Christianity, no special meaning is attributed to the life
and death of Jesus because he is of no importance in Judaism. Jesus becomes important to
Jews only because they live in a pervasively Christian world.
121. All citations to the New Testament will be from the King James version.
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interpret to show that Jesus' life and death as the Messiah had been
prophesied.ln The disciples sought to deny or negate the Jewish
understanding of Judaic history in their effort to bolster the Christian
interpretation of history as leading to Jesus as the Messiah.'2s The New
Testament, in short, attempts to (re) define Judaism itself to serve Christian
purposes. 24 Furthermore, the New Testament objectifies Jews and
attempts to establish their inferiority. According to Christian discourse,
Jews refused to accept Jesus because they were from the Devil.125 The
New Testament narrative therefore expressly designates the Jews as
deserving a fate of endless persecution and suffering-until they finally
26
realize their blindness and come to believe thatJesus was Christ
The initial redefinition of Jews in the New Testament has generated

122. Christians therefore read the Old Testament differently from how Jews read the
Hebrew Bible. In each religion, the text (of the Hebrew Bible or Old Testament) is
understood within the context of a larger canon (and each religion has a different larger
canon). See Neusner, supra note 25, at ix-x (discussing these relationships); Ruether, supra
note 25, at 117-82 (discussing the negation of the Jews); Gregory Baum, Introduction, in
Ruether, supra note 25, at 1, 11-12. In fact, the New Testament at times seems to blatantly
misread the Hebrew Bible. See Ruether, supra note 25, at 86, 109 (describing the inconsistencies between the New Testament and the Hebrew Bible).
123. Parkes, Judaism, supra note 25, at 107-08; Ruether, supra note 25, at 89-95; Wistrich,
supra note 25, at 13-14.
124. The New Testament maintains that Jews had misunderstood their own laws and
covenant with God. "Search the scriptures; for in them ye think ye have eternal life: and they
are they which testify of me. And ye will not come to me, that ye might have life." John 5:3940; sew Matthew 22:34-46 (Jesus argues that Pharisees misunderstood the Hebrew Scriptures);
Galatians 2:21 (attacking Jewish law). Moreover, the New Testament insists that the Jewish
covenant with God had always been defective. In short, the Jews never had known God: "And
the Father himself, which hath sent me, hath borne witness of me. Ye have neither heard his
voice at any time, nor seen his shape. And ye have not his word abiding in you: for whom he
hath sent, him ye believe not." John 5:37-38; accord Matthew 22:29, 34-46 (stating that
Pharisees did not understand God); Galatians 2:21 (attacking Jewish law); Acts 28:26-28
(stating that Jews never understood God); Hebrews 8:6-13 (stating that the Jewish covenant
was defective); see Ruether, supra note 25, at 70-73 (arguing thatJesus' Disciples searched the
Hebrew Bible to show that it meant that Jesus was the messiah).
125. The New Testament states:
Jesus said unto them, If God were your Father, ye would love me: for I proceeded
forth and came from God; neither came I of myself, but he sent me. Why do ye not
understand my speech? even because ye cannot hear my word. Ye are of your father
the devil, and the lusts of your father ye will do. He was a murderer from the
beginning, and abode not in the truth, because there is no truth in him. When he
speaketh a lie, he speaketh of his own: for he is a liar, and the father of it. And
because I tell you the truth, ye believe me not.
John 8:42-45.
126. The New Testament states:
0 Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are
sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a
hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not Behold, your house
is left unto you desolate. For I say unto you, Ye shall not see me henceforth, till ye
shall say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord.
Matthew 23:37-39.

RELIGION CLAUSES
and appeared to justify many subsequent imperialistic acts by Christians.
For hundreds of years during the Middle Ages, Jews were persecuted,
subjugated, and sometimes even banished from Christian society. They
were forced to wear badges or other signs of identification, isolated in
ghettos, and exiled from entire countries.2 In twentieth-century Europe,
the persistent objectification of Jews facilitated the Holocaust. Average
Germans more readily performed their jobs within the bureaucratic state
because they felt spiritually and emotionally distant from Jews, and,
eventually, this distance was solidified by the physical isolation of Jews in
ghettos and concentration camps.1 28 In sum, for nearly two thousand
years of Western history, Christian hegemonic power has been remarkably
the Christian discourse of redefinition has created a
complete. Indeed,
"conceptual Jew" '29 that is so unconnected to reality that it can be
blamed for just about anything, including capitalism, communism, the
Bubonic Plague, the deaths of Christian children, and even the
Holocausil °

127. Johnson, supra note 26, at 169-310; Parkes, Judaism, supra note 25, at 135 & n.35. For
an example of a decree from the thirteenth century that required Jews to wear conical hats or
yellow patches, see Innocent and the Jews 1215, in The Jew in the Medieval World: A Source
Book, 315-1791, at 138 (Jacob R. Marcus ed., 1938) [hereinafter A Source Book]. Books that
discuss the development of Christianity, antisemitism, or the doctrine of separation of church
and state during the Roman Empire and the Middle Ages include the following: Harold J.
Berman, Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition (1983); Church
and State Through the Centuries: A Collection of Historic Documents With Commentaries
(Sidney Z. Ehler & John B. Morral trans. & eds., 1954); Margaret Deanesly, A History of the
Medieval Church 590-1500 (8th ed. 1954); Documents of the Christian Church (Henry S.
Bettenson ed., 2d ed. 1967); A Source Book, supra; James Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers, and
Infidels: The Church and the Non-Christian World, 1250-1550 (1979); Select Historical
Documents of the Middle Ages (Ernest F. Henderson ed., 1892); Edward A. Synan, The Popes
and the Jews in the Middle Ages (1965); Brian Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 10501300: With Selected Documents (1988); Brian Tierney, Religion, Law, and the Growth of
Constitutional Thought, 1150-1650 (1982); Walter Ullmann, The Growth of Papal
Government in the Middle Ages (1955); Walter Ulmann, A History of Political Thought: The
Middle Ages (1965); Williston Walker, A History of the Christian Church (3d ed. 1970).
128. Metaphorically speaking, Jews were transformed into weeds to be removed rationally
and efficiently from the Christian garden. Bauman, supra note 25, at 65, 70, 73, 91-92, 113-14.
129. Id. at 3941; cf.Jaher, supra note 25, at 59 (exploring how Jews were no longer seen
as real people, but became semblances of Christian doubts and anxieties). Jonathan A. Bush
describes howJews were used as prototypical outsiders to help construct legal hypotheticals in
the early common law. Since Jews were barely present in England at the time, the dominant
Christian legal discourse freely definedJews. Jonathan A. Bush, "You're Gonna Miss Me When
I'm Gone": Early Modem Common Law Discourse and the Case of the Jews, 1993 Wis. L Rev.
1225.
130. Johnson, supra note 26, at 207; Wistrich, supra note 25, at 26-32, 96, 164-65; see, eg.,
Karl Marx, On the Jewish Question (1843), in The Marx-Engels Reader 26, 49 (Robert C.
Tucker ed., 2d ed. 1978) (blamingJews for causing Christians to become capitalists). Wistrich
writes: "Austrian 'antisemitism without Jews' (they constitute only 0.1 per cent of the total
population) seemed to be illustrating the truth of Henryk Broder's remark about the
Germans: that they will never forgive the Jews for Auschwitzl" Wistrich, supra note 25, at 96.
Nazi Germany continued to oppress Jews when only the conceptual Jew remained. "Even
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In America today, the more common form of antisemitic redefinition
is denial of difference. Many Christians seem to consider Judaism to be
merely a quirky Protestant sect: Chanukah, for example, becomes the
Jewish Christmas when Jews erect Chanukah bushes. Christian hegemony
and the concomitant denial of difference are so complete in America that
the most egregious examples of cultural imperialism fade to invisibility.
Jews must accept the public display of a creche as representative of secular
American traditions. Jews must participate in annual Christmas parties,
plays, carol singing, and other Christian traditions. Any Jew who objects is
(take your pick) pushy, odd, a killjoy, or ridiculous. Jews, after all, are
(supposedly) no different from other (Christian) Americans, and
therefore, they should participate in the "neutral" and "secular" social
activities of the school, business, and community.lu In short, even the
most blatant, ostentatious, and public celebratory symbols of Christianity
are considered neither extraordinary nor offensive; to the contrary, they
usually are accepted, condoned, and sometimes even governmentally
financed.112 From this perspective, many if not most Christian individuals
do not intentionally oppress or discriminate against Jews. Rather, Christian
Americans (as well as members of American religious outgroups, such as
Jews) are born and mature within a pervasively Christian society that
acculturates them to (immediately and unconsciously) understand
3
Christian views, symbols, and activities as neutral, normal, and natural.!

when deportations and mass murder were already under way, decrees appeared in 1942
prohibiting German Jews from having pets, getting their hair cut by Aryan barbers, or
receiving the Reich sport badgel" Bauman, supra note 25, at 17 (quoting Christopher R.
Browning, The German Bureaucracy and the Holocaust, in Genocide: Critical Issues of the
Holocaust 147 (Alex Grobman & Daniel Landes eds., 1983)).
131. Cf Mordecai M. Kaplan, The Jew in the Modem Word A Documentary History 399
(Paul R. Mendes-Flohr & Jehuda Reinharz eds., 1980) (stating that Judaism in America is
legitimated in part by being cast merely as a religion, like Protestantism or Catholicism, not as
a cultural or ethnic identity).
132. John M. Hartenstein writes:
Children searching for the meaning of Christmas will have no trouble discovering a
religious message that has been carried worldwide for nearly two thousand years. The
ritual is emblazoned on stamps and repeated in television and radio advertisements,
"news" stories, broadcasts of midnight mass, and the lyrics of ubiquitous Christmas
hymns; it is on storefronts, private lawns, churchyards-even in public parks and on
the courthouse steps.
John M. Hartenstein, Comment, A Christmas Issue: Christian Holiday Celebration in the
Public Elementary Schools Is an Establishment of Religion, 80 Cal. L Rev. 981, 999 (1992)
[hereinafter A Christmas Issue].
133. The theologian, James Parkes, writes:
[Dlay by day, week by week, year by year, century by century, the New Testament is
read "as the word of God" without omission or comment. Is not this the reason why
Jews are treated differently from others, why protest is not made which would be
made for any other people? It has sunk into the sub-conscious--or unconscious-of
Christians that "after all, Jews ought to have become Christians, and, if they don't see
It, they can fairly be expected to take the consequences." Their conduct two
thousand years ago is constantly brought before us: they are never shown as a

RELGION CLAUSES
The legal discourse of the religion clauses contributes to this cultural
imperialism by construing or labeling oppressive Christian displays and
revelries either as secular or as protected private sphere activities.'1
Understood at its most basic level, the principle of separation of church
and state supposedly prohibits the conjunction of government and
religion. Hence, the religion clauses theoretically protect and legitimate
any activity or symbol that somehow is divorced from either government or
religion or both. When, for example, a particular activity is defined or
coded as private-separate from government-then the constitutional
constraints imposed upon state actors are rendered irrelevant. The Court
found this public versus private dichotomy to be crucial in Capitol Square
Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette."' The Court held that the display of
a large Latin (Christian) cross on public property did not violate the
Establishment Clause. The public property, a "state-owned plaza
surrounding the Statehouse in Columbus, Ohio, " '36 qualified as a
traditional public forum because "[f]or over a century the square [had]
been used for public speeches, gatherings, and festivals."' s7 The plurality
opinion emphasized that a private actor, the Ku Klux Klan, and not the
government had erected the cross: "[P]rivate religious expression receives
preferentialtreatment under the Free Exercise Clause. It is no answer to say
that the Establishment Clause tempers religious speech. By its terms that
Clause applies only to the words and acts of government. It [does not
impede] purely private religious speech. . . ."8 Thus, even when the
government must grant a permit to a speaker, as in Pinette, the constraints
of the Establishment Clause do not apply; private actors are free to
disseminate their Christian messages on publicly owned property. In fact,
quite predictably, after the district court issued an injunction permitting

normal, contemporary people with a normal contemporary religion.
James Parkes, Preface, in Antisemitism and Foundations of Christianity, supra note 25, at v, xxi.

Hartenstein writes similarly:
Whether or not children are formally instructed in religion, modem school holiday
observances are likely to socialize on the informal level. For example, a teacher
probably would not give a formal lesson on why children should decorate Christmas
trees or instruct children on the feelings and expectations they should develop at
Christmastime, but might have children make Christmas decorations or read a
Christmas story.

A Christmas Issue, supra note 132, at 997; cf. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving- Gender and Race
Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 817, 841-42, 846 (1991) (rejecting
animus-based theories as the best explanation for empirically documented gender and racial
discrimination in retail car negotiations).
134. Mark Tushnet observes that "where the Justices feel pressure to validate a religious
activity, they are likely to respond by treating it as essentially nonreligious." Tushnet, supra
note 4, at 399.
135. 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995).
136. Id. at 2444.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 2449 (emphasis added); accordid. at 2447-49.
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the Klan to erect its cross, the state "then received, and granted, several
additional applications to erect crosses on [the public plaza]." "59
Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith,"'
when viewed in conjunction with Pinette, elucidates the intimate link
between the public/private dichotomy and Christian societal domination.
The religious rituals of the Native American Church include the supervised
consumption of peyote, but Oregon criminal law prohibited the use of
peyote without exception. The Smith Court held that the state law did not
violate the Free Exercise Clause: "[T]he right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral
law of general applicability.' 14 1 In so holding, the Court expressly
modified free exercise doctrine. State laws, in most instances, will no
longer be subject to the (supposedly) strict judicial scrutiny of the
compelling state interest test. 42 Instead, the protection of free exercise
values should be left to the "political process. " '4 Even the Court
acknowledged that this constitutional doctrine might harm religious
outgroups: "It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the
political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religions
practices that are not widely engaged in; but that [is an] unavoidable
consequence of democratic government...."'4 Thus, while the Pinette
Court emphasized that the Free Exercise Clause extends preferential
treatment to private religious expression, the Smith Court declared that the
Free Exercise Clause allows the majority, through legislation, to restrict the
religious practices of minorities. If these two cases are read together in the
context of American society, they suggest that the Free Exercise Clause
extends preferential treatment to the majority's (Christian) religious
expression and beliefs. Because the overwhelming majority of Americans
are Christian, most private religious experssion will be Christian (and
protected by Pinette), and most legislative actions will reflect Christian
beliefs and practices (and be protected by Smith).""

139. Id. at 2445.
140. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
141. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1932) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)). The Smith Court reasoned that the Free Exercise Clause extends greater
protection to religious beliefs than to religious conduct. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-79. This
preference for belief (or faith) over conduct corresponds with a distinctly Protestant Christian
world view. Mard A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free
Exercise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54
Ohio St. L.J. 713, 716-17 (1993).
142. Smith, 494 U.S. at 883-86. Rather bizarrely, the Smith Court limited the applicability of
the compelling state interest test to cases involving the denial of unemployment compensation. Id. at 883; see, e.g., Sherbertv. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (finding it unconstitutional to
disqualify an employee who refused to work on Saturday for religious reasons from receiving
unemployment benefits).
143. Smith, 494 U.S. at 890.
144. Id.
145. In O'Connor's Pinette concurrence, she at least recognized the possibility of majority
domination and stated, "At some point, for example, a private religious group may so

RELIGION CLAUSES
In a similar vein, when a particular activity is defined or coded as
secular,the activity supposedly has been "removed from the domination of
religious institutions" 14 and is therefore legitimated by the principle of
separation of church and state. Despite the possibility that a Jew or a
member of another religious outgroup might experience or perceive that
very activity as decidedly Christian, the declaration of secularity by the
Supreme Court or some other empowered governmental actor or
institution, such as a School Board, justifies the activity within the
dominant discourse. And quite often, constitutional rhetoric
imperialistically ignores religious outgroups and the oppressive
consequences of Christian activities and symbols for members of such
outgroups; in other words, there is a denial of experiences and perceptions
that differ from the Christian viewpoint. In this manner, constitutional
rhetoric effectively neutralizes or normalizes many common forms of
Christian societal domination by declaring or coding them to be
4
secular.4'
49
For example, in McGowan v. Maryland14 and Braunfeld v. Brown,1
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Sunday closing laws in
the face of Establishment and Free Exercise Clause challenges. The Court
claimed to identify the general sentiments of the American people by
effacing the differences between Christian Americans and other Americans
(the plaintiffs in Braunfed, for instance, were OrthodoxJews).
[I]t is common knowledge that the first day of the week has come
to have special significance as a rest day in this country. People of
all religions and people with no religion regard Sunday as a time for
family activity, for visiting friends and relatives, for late sleeping,
for passive and active entertainments, for dining out, and the like.
"Vast masses of our people, in fact, literally millions, go out into the
countryside on fine Sunday afternoons in the Summer .... "
Sunday is a day apart from all others. The cause is irrelevant; the
fact exists. It would seem unrealistic for enforcement purposes and
perhaps detrimental to the general welfare to require a State to
dominate a public forum that a formal policy of equal access is transformed into a
demonstration of approval." Pinete, 115 S. Ct. at 2454 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

The Christian majority might express its toleration for outgroup religions by

occasionally extending protection to the outgroup's religious practices. See, eg., Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994) (restoring the
compelling state interest test for laws of general applicability that infringe free exercise
rights). As will become evident by the end of this Article, when these acts of toleration occur,
they usually benefit the majority (sometimes more so than the minority) and almost never
harm the majority.
146. Berger, supra note 119, at 107.
147. Cf Linda R. Hirshman, The Rape of the Locke: Race, Gender, and the Loss of
Liberal Virtue, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 1133, 1157-58 (1992) (arguing that feminists emphasize that
liberalism and social contract theory leave intact private exercises of power).
148. 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (holding that Maryland laws that prohibited business activity on
Sunday did not violate the U.S. Constitution).
149.

366 U.S. 599 (1961).
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choose a common day of rest other than that which most persons
would select of their own accord.Ie
The Court, trivializing the long history surrounding Sunday Blue Laws, m1
concluded that the governmental choice of Sunday for a day of mandated
rest was "of a secular rather than of a religious character."" 2 Consequently, the Orthodox Jewish plaintiffs in Braunfeld effectively were forced to
observe the Christian day of rest, Sunday, even though their own sabbath
was Saturday."'
Based on similar though perhaps more outrageous reasoning, Lynch v.
Donnelly held that the public display of a creche does not violate the
Establishment Clause.15 The Court wrote:
When viewed in the proper context of the ChristmasHoliday season,
it is apparent that.., there is insufficient evidence to establish
that the inclusion of the creche is a purposeful or surreptitious
effort to express some kind of subtle governmental advocacy of a
particular religious message. In a pluralistic society a variety of
motives and purposes are implicated. The City... has principally
taken note of a signyifcant historicalreligiousevent long celebrated in
the Western World. The creche in the display depicts the historical
origins of this traditional event long recognized as a National
Holiday.... The narrow question is whether there is a secular
purpose for Pawtucket's display of the creche. The display is
sponsored by the City to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the

150.
151.

McGowan, 366 U.S. at 451-52 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
See id. at 431-35 (noting the increased significance of secular reasons for establishing

Sunday as a day of rest).
152. Id. at 444. In Braunfied the plurality stated:
[The statute does not force] the choice [on] the individual of either abandoning his
religious principle or facing criminal prosecution... because the statute... does
not make unlawful any religious practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply
regulates a se-ular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to make the
practice of their religious beliefs more expensive.
Braunfild, 366 U.S. at 605 (emphasis added). The plurality appeared to be reasoning that
keeping one's business open or dosed is merely a secular activity. While that assertion may be
correct, it is certainly not true that keeping one's business open or closed on Sunday is
secular. Rather, the choice of Sunday obviously reflects the religious preferences of the
dominant Christian majority. Id. at 614 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. As Mark Tushnet observes: "[T]he pattern of the Court's results in mandatory
accommodation [cases] is troubling because, put bluntly, the pattern is that sometimes
Christians win but non-Christians never do." Tushnet, supra note 4, at 381.
154. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). The creche was displayed in conjunction with several other
objects, most of which were Christmas decorations. The Court described the display as follows:
The Pawtucket display comprises many of the figures and decorations traditionally
associated with Christmas, including, among other things, a Santa Claus house,
reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candy-striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout
figures representing such characters as a down, an elephant, and a teddy bear,
hundreds of colored lights, a large banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," and
the crache at issue here. All components of this display are owned by the City.
Id. at 671.
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origins of that Holiday. These are legitimate secular purposes. 55
This passage illustrates how the Court used legal discourse to neutralize
the Christian message of a creche for purposes of constitutional
adjudication. In the Court's terms, Christmas-the Christian holiday
celebrating the birth of Jesus Christ--somehow becomes secular. The
Court coded (or labeled) Christmas as a traditional and historical event,
and the very birth of Jesus himself became merely the historical origin of
that event Hence, members of religious outgroups are symbolically
absorbed into the Christian mainstream so that they too must enjoy and
celebrate "thd' Holiday. 5 6
Regardless of how a dominant culture attempts to redefine a
subculture and its members-either through denial of difference, or
exclusion and objectification, or both-one symptom (and cause) of
redefinition is the silence (and even invisibility) of the Other.' 7 Members
of the subcultural group go unheard (and sometimes unseen) by members
of the dominant cultural and other subcultural groups. Indeed, in the face
of cultural imperialism, outgroup members sometimes figuratively and
sometimes literally stop speaking, so that there is nothing to be heard.'s
In Lynch, for example, the Court supported its conclusion by noting that,
prior to that lawsuit, nobody had complained about the creche even
though it had been publicly displayed for forty years.'59 To the Court, this
silence meant that the creche had not generated dissension-apparently,
everybody happily supported the Christmas display. The Court overlooked
the possibility, however, that Christian cultural imperialism had produced
the silence of religious outgroup members. Silence often demonstrates
domination, not consensus.
B. StructuralPower
Although language is both a technique and an effect of power that
contributes to cultural imperialism, language simultaneously floats or plays
at a distance from power. For instance, when the Supreme Court denies
the habeas petition of a capital defendant, the consequences that follow
are unrelated to the niceties of legal reasoning in the Court's opinion. The
reality of an execution does not turn on whether the legal doctrine or
discourse mandated a particular conclusion. To the contrary, the justices
on the Supreme Court exercise power over habeas petitioners not

155. Id. at 680-81 (emphasis added).
156. In another case, the Court reasoned that a military rule that prevents an Orthodox
Jew from wearing a yarmulke (skull cap) is neutral and evenhanded. Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986).
157. Cf Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory and Law, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 59,
66-78 (describing how patriarchal power produces silence in women).
158. Cf. Scott, supra note 15, at 3 (stating that the greater the domination of a
subordinate group, the more likely the subordinated will say, if anything, what the dominant

wants to hear).
159.

Lynw, 465 U.S. at 684-85; accord id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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necessarily because of legal acumen or judicial expertise, but exactly
because they are Supreme Court justices. Each justice operates from a
position or role of extraordinary power within the social institution of the
criminal justice system.'t From this perspective, we see that power
frequently is structural.'' That is, power "exists in relationships-it has a
primary location in the ongoing, habitual ways in which human beings
relate to one another."' 62 Individuals often exercise power not because of
their personal qualities, abilities, or knowledge, but because they occupy
certain relatively embedded though contingent social roles that endure
within complex social practices and institutions. To be dear, social roles do
not exist in some pure or idealistic sense; they are neither self-defining nor
defined solely through language (though discourse contributes to the
construction of social roles). Rather, social roles are defined in part by the
institutional positions, by the organizational
relations between various
6s
scheme of the society.1

160. See Feldman, Diagnosing Power, supra note 16, at 1071-72 (focusing on structural
power in the context of habeas petitions); cf Douglas Hay, Property, Authority and the
Criminal Law, in Albion's Fatal Tree 17, 44-45 (Douglas Hay et al. eds., 1975) (noting that in
eighteenth century England, the rule of law did not determine which criminal defendants
were executed; more broadly, the rule of law did not control the exercise of power).
161. Margaret A. Coulson and Carol Riddell write:
[A] watch is not just the sum of its parts, but the sum of its parts plus the way they
are put together, related to each other, organized. In the same way, society is more
than the sum of the people in it. It is not only the people, but also the ay they are
related to each other, organized-the social structure. If this is correct, what goes on
in society can't be explained solely in terms of individuals, but only by understanding
the way they are related to each other.
Margaret A. Coulson & Carol Riddell, Approaching Sociology: A Critical Introduction 44-45
(1970); c. Peter L Berger, Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective 86-98 (1963)
(emphasizing how social institutions pattern human conduct as if individuals were playing
various roles as in a play); Kennedy, supra note 15, at 158 (stating that sign systems and social
structures shape the world).
162. Wartenberg, supra note 15, at 165 (emphasis omitted).
163. Cf.Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory 12-18 (1979) (emphasizing
that a social role should be understood, in part, as the product of the differences or
oppositions from other such roles). Wartenberg writes that "power ...accrues to individuals
when they occupy certain social roles." Wartenberg, supra note 15, at 157. He adds that an
"expert may be an authority about certain subject matters, [but] this authority is distinguishable from the authority she comes to have as a result of being situated as an empowered
agent." Id. at 154; see Barry Barnes, The Nature of Power 61 (1988) ("[T]he powerful agent
possesses power in a sense, but the power he possesses resides in the social context and
outside its possessor."); Berger, supra note 119, at 86-98 (emphasizing how social institutions
pattern human conduct as if individuals were playing various roles).
One should not, however, overestimate the stability of social roles, which are always
contingent. See Coulson & Riddell, supra note 161, at 17-18, 39, 46-47 (emphasizing that social

roles or "positions" change). Coulson and Riddell write:
[A] person's behaviour in a position depends on an interaction between his own

learned expectations and the pressures put upon him by others with possibly
different expectations... which also depends on the power they have over him, an
interaction which will be in constant change as the power relationships change-in

RELIGION CLAUSES
Furthermore, social roles do not merely empower individuals, such as
Supreme Courtjustices, to perform certain actions; rather, social roles also
help produce perceptions, attitudes, and actions. In other words, social
structures and the resultant social roles at least partly construct or
constitute subjects or persons. The very identity and being of an individual
is partly constituted by the position or role that he or she holds within the
organizational scheme of the society-by the set of social relations that the
T
individual's position or role holds vis-a-vis other positions and roles. M
Hence, some feminists emphasize that a nurturing relationship between
parent and infant can produce certain pro-social identities.s At the same
time, however, this perspective underscores that cruelty, hatred, and
inhumanity are also at least partly socially produced through the structural
organization of society. An otherwise ordinary and moral person can
readily perform incredible atrocities against others if placed in the
appropriate social role. In one psychology experiment, for example,
subjects were divided into two groups, prisoners and guards, with the
guards having complete control over the prisoners. Beyond all
expectations, the guards enthusiastically fulfilled their authoritarian roles
by brutally mistreating the prisoners.ee As Iris Marion Young writes:
Oppression [including cultural imperialism] in the structural
sense is part of the basic fabric of a society, not a function of a
few people's choice or policies. You won't eliminate this structural
oppression by getting rid of the rulers or making some new laws,
because oppressions are systematically reproduced
in major
67
economic, political, and cultural institutions.
From this perspective, we can understand antisemitism to be at least
partly structural. Once again, we see that antisemitism is not merely a

other words, a dialectical relationship.
Id. at 41.
164. Pierre Bourdeu argues that personal dispositions adjust to the logic of societal
positions. Bourdieu & Wacquant, supra note 15, at 74, 81; see also Berger, supra note 119, at
67, 78, 86-99 (explaining how social practices embedded in traditions determine individual
actions and being). Foucault has focused extensively on the social and historical constitution
of the subject. See, eg., Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 15; Foucault, Why Study
Power, supra note 15. In legal theory, Pierre Schlag has consistently focused on the social
construction of the subject. See, eg., Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 Stan. L.
Rev. 167 (1990); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 Tex. L Rev. 1627 (1991). I
discuss Schlag's work in "Diagnosing Power," supra note 16, at 1084-1104.
165. Sawicki, supra note 15, at 63; see generally Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (1982)
(discussing the psychology of an ethic of care); Nel Noddings, Caring (1984) (discussing the
philosophy of an ethic of care).
166. Craig Haney et al., Interpersonal Dynamics in a Simulated Prison, 1 Int'l J.
Criminology & Penology 69, 84 (1973); see Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An
Experimental View (1974) (discussing psychology experiments that suggest that social roles
produce inhumanity); see also Bauman, supra note 25, at 152-67 (discussing implications of
Milgram and Zimbardo's experiments).
167. Iris M. Young, Five Faces of Oppression, in Rethinking Power, supra note 15, at 174,
176.
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matter of intentional discrimination against Jews.I" Rather, individuals
(typically, Christians) fulfill their roles within an antisemitically structured
society-a society organized in a manner to produce social relations
manifesting antisemitism. Moreover, since social structures partly constitute
subjects, the antisemitic structures embedded in society partly construct or
constitute the Christian subject or individual to be antisenitic. To be clear,
I do not mean that every Christian person intentionally discriminates
against Jews, but rather that most Christians participate in cultural
imperialism by assuming that certain inherently Christian symbols and
interpretations of social reality represent the normal, the neutral, and the
natural. And most Christians participate in cultural imperialism exactly
because they are Christians: Whether or not they actively practice
Christianity, they occupy the position of a Christian in a society
hegemonically dominated by Christian culture and religion.
I discussed earlier how the legal discourse of the religion clauses
contributes to Christian cultural imperialism. 6 9 Yet, once Christian
imperialism and antisemitism are revealed to be also structural, legal
discourse appears in an alternative light, as but one factor affecting the
strength and pervasiveness of religion in society. Consequently, legal
discourse might, in some circumstances, have little effect on the Christian
domination of America, what might be called the societal establishment of
religion. In a comparative study of religion in nineteenth century America
and England, Martin Marty observes:
The program of the disestablished national churches in
America was almost identical with that proposed by leaders of the
established national church in England. They would serve as
educators, providers of a moral foundation, preservers of order,
and inculcators of virtue and piety and would provide a network
of voluntary associations which became, said critic-from-within
Calvin Colton, "so numerous, so great, so active and influential,
that, as a whole, they now constitute the great school of public
education, in the formation of those practical opinions, religious,
social, and political, which lead the public mind and govern the
country." 170
168. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text (describing the acculturation of
Christian Americans to understand Christian symbols as neutral).
169. See supra notes 132-57 and accompanying text (explaining how religion clauses are
contributing factors to Christian cultural imperialism).

170. Martin E. Marty, Living With Establishment and Disestablishment in NineteenthCentury Anglo-America, in Readings on Church and State 55, 67 (James E. Wood, Jr., ecL,
1989) (quoting Calvin Colton, A Voice from America to England: By an American Gentleman
97 (1839)). In a similar vein, Richard S. Kay notes that, in 1982, Canada adopted the
equivalent of a free exercise clause but did not adopt an establishment clause. To Kay, before
that time, Canada already had a liberal, tolerant society, and since that time, the Canadian
record on religious tolerance appears as good as that of the United States. On the other
hand, Kay argues that Canada does not prohibit the type of noncoercive injuries that the

American establishment clause prevents. Richard S. Kay, The Canadian Constitution and the
Dangers of Establishment, 42 DePaul L. Rev. 361 (1992). Meanwhile, Susan M. Gilles argues
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Thus, the existence or non-existence of an officially (or governmentally)
established church does not necessarily affect the power of Christianity
pulsing through the social body. In some instances, establishment might
not alter the degree of Christian cultural imperialism. Historian Frederic
Cople Jaher underscores that antisemitism increased in nineteenth century
America even as more and more states disestablished their churches-.7'
Thus, legal discourse, even Supreme Court constitutional discourse on the
religion clauses, does not completely control the manifestation of power in
the religious realm.
Rather, the power of Christianity is partly
structural; it arises from the organization of social relations, from the daily,
mundane social interactions of individuals fulfilling certain social roles or
positions."'
C. The Interaction of Symbolic and StructuralPower
Symbolic and structural power can interact to produce ideology:
symbolism, usually language, that either justifies, legitimates, explains,
masks, or renders uncontroversial particular structured social relations.7
In the particular context of separation of church and state, the
constitutional discourse of the religion clauses masks and legitimates
Christian hegemony.' 75 The dominant story of church and state maintains

that the Church establishment in England has both advantages and disadvantages. She
underscores, however, that mainstream religions are favored in government funding and that
outgroup religions occasionally encounter free exercise problems. Susan M. Gilles, "Worldly
Corruptions" and "Ecclesiastical Depedations": How Bad Is an Established Church?, 42 DePaul
L Rev. 349 (1992).
171. Jaher, supra note 25, at 170-241.
172. Cf. Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?
(1991) (noting that the Supreme Court generally does not cause significant social change).
173. Cf Berman, supra note 127, at 556 ("Law spreads upward from the bottom and not
only downward from the top."); Merry, supra note 15, at 209-10 (asserting that law helps
constitute social relations, and simultaneously, law is constituted through social relations).
174. The relation between linguistic and structural power is complex, and the production
of ideology is merely part of it. On the one hand, linguistic power helps reconstruct the social
relations that generate societal structures both directly (for instance, by coding the existence
of certain social roles) and indirectly (for instance, by providing the ideological rhetoric that
hides the structural imposition of power). On the other hand, structural power helps
reconstruct language because structures help produce both the individual (who uses language
appropriate to his or her role) and the entire social system (which provides the environment
for nurturing the particular language of that social system). Pierre Bourdieu writes:
[I]t is in the correspondence of structure to structure that the properly ideological
function of the dominant discourse is performed. This discourse is a structured and
structuring medium tending to impose an apprehension of the established order as
natural (orthodoxy) through the disguised (and thus misrecognized) imposition of
systems of classification and of mental structures that are objectively adjusted to
social structures.
Bourdieu, supra note 15, at 169.
175. See gmfraly Alan D. Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law. A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 Minn. L Rev. 1049
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that the religion clauses of the Constitution protect minority religions
against oppression. Supposedly, the principle of separation of church and
state secures religious liberty fully and equally for all, including religious
outgroups. Hence, the story continues: To safeguard the all-important
principle of separation of church and state, the Supreme Court stands
vigil, enforcing the religion clauses by ensuring that the government does
not become overly involved in religion. Yet, contrary to the rhetoric of the
dominant story, the structure of American society constantly produces and
reproduces Christian hegemonic domination, regardless of governmental
involvement or noninvolvement in religion. In other words, constitutional
discourse furnishes a facade of governmental neutrality and individual
religious freedom, but behind that legitimating facade, Christian cultural
imperialism pulses through the social body of America.
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union"6 illustrates in an
interesting fashion how constitutional discourse can legitimate Christian
cultural imperialism. In that case, the Court held that the public display of
a creche violated the Establishment Clause; the Court distinguished Lynch
v. Donnelly'" by underscoring that the creche in Lynch was part of a
larger display, while the creche at dispute in Allegheny stood alone." 8
Although Allegheny initially appears to recognize the strong Christian
symbolism of Christmas and Christmas displays, the Court nonetheless
noted: "The presence of Santas or other Christmas decorations elsewhere
in the county courthouse... fail[s] to negate the endorsement effect of
the creche. The record demonstrates dearly that the crche, with its floral
frame, was its own display distinct from any other decorations or
exhibitions in the building."79 Hence, the Court held that a crbche
standing alone is religious, but in so doing, the Court legitimated as
secular the display of many other Christmas, and hence Christian, symbols
such as a Santa Claus and a Christmas tree. 8 ' In fact, the Court bizarrely
suggested that a creche would be rendered secular if it were displayed with
other Christmas decorations. 81
This discussion of ideology suggests that, perhaps, I too quickly
criticized Smith's assertion that a judicial withdrawal from the field of
religious liberty might improve the position of outgroup religions by

(1978)

(arguing that antidiscrimination law tends to perpetuate and legitimize racial

discrimination).
176. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
177. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
178. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-602.
179. Id. at 598-99 n.48.
180. Indeed, Justice Blackmun explicitly stated that a "Christmas tree... is not itself a
religious symbol." Id. at 616; accord id. at 632-33 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
181. On a personal note, I have known many Jewish children who wanted a Christmas tree
or to visit with Santa Claus, but I have never known any Jew who believed that Christmas,
Christmas trees, and Santa were Jewish or anything other than Christian. Of. Allegheny, 492
U.S. at 639-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that a Christmas tree is not secular).
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generating a "net gain" in religious freedom.ls 2 After all, a judicial
withdrawal would prevent the Supreme Court from producing the
constitutional discourse that functions as an ideological justification for
Christian cultural imperialism. Nonetheless, Smith does not claim that
constitutional discourse would no longer be produced, but rather that the
Supreme Court would not be generating it. Instead, the more political
branches and the so-called private sphere would continue to produce
ideological and constitutional discourse. More important, Smith's assertion
fails to account for the intricacy of church and state relations in American
society. For outgroup religions, the costs and benefits of separation of
church and state cannot be tallied simply on some imaginary balance
sheet.
Derrick Bell's interest-convergence thesis can help further elaborate
the ideological quality of religion clause jurisprudence. According to Bell,
African Americans historically have gained social justice only when their
8s
interests happened to converge with the interests of the white majority.
For example, Bell argues that the Supreme Court decided Brown v. Board of
Education8 4 not because it was morally or legally right, but because it
coincided with the interests of middle- and upper-class whites.18s If we
attempt to transfer this interest-convergence thesis to the realm of religion,
specifically to the separation of church and state, then we can generalize
and enhance the thesis, understanding it anew as representing a technique
of power.
The doctrine of separation of church and state assumes that the state
poses the greatest threat to religious liberty. 8 s This assumption arises in

182. Smith, supra note 8, at 126.
183. Bell writes: "[T]he degree of progress blacks have made away from slavery and toward
equality has depended on whether allowing blacks more or less opportunity best served the
interests and aims of white society." Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Race, Racism and American Law 39
(2d ed. 1980). Similarly, Malcolm X states: "Uncle Sam has no conscience. They don't know
what morals are. They don't try and eliminate an evil because it's evil, or because it's illegal,
or because it's immoral; they eliminate it only when it threatens their existence." Malcolm X,
The Ballot or the Bullet, in Malcolm X Speaks 23, 40 (G. Breitman ed., 1965).
184. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
185. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 (1980); see also Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War
Imperative, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 61, 64 (1988) (stating that Brown resulted, at least in part, from
the white majority's interest in improving the image of the United States in foreign affairs).
186. In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the Court recognized that the despotic
state is less of a problem today than during the framers' generation, yet the Court continued
to interpret the Establishment Clause as if the state posed the only danger to outgroup
religions. The Court wrote:
The Court has acknowledged that the "fears and political problems" that gave
rise to the Religion Clauses in the 18th century are of far less concern today. We are
unable to perceive the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Bishop of Rome, or other
powerful religious leaders behind every public acknowledgment of the religious
heritage long officially recognized by the three constitutional branches of
government Any notion that these symbols pose a real danger of establishment of a
state church is far-fetched indeed.
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part from a vision of a pre-capitalist and pre-democratic despotic state
establishing an official religion and forcing individuals to support that
favored religion.'7 In the modern/postmodern Western world, however,
this vision of a despotic state is anachronistic.'" Today, the state exercises
"infrastructural power."' Whereas the despotic state stood separate from
and ruled over the rest of society, the infrastructural state exhaustively
permeates society-influencing, shaping, and coordinating all aspects of
social life.'" While the infrastructural state still occasionally exercises
despotic power, it emerges more often as one force or realm of power that,
together with other forces or realms of power, spreads and pulses through the
social body.' As such, the democratic modern/postmodem state
represents little threat to a hegemonically dominant cultural group, such as
Christians in America. Quite simply, in a democracy dominated by
Christians, the government can no longer muster the despotic power to
oppress Christians qua Christans. 92
Id. at 686 (citations omitted).

187. Foucault discusses "the juridical-political theory of society," in which law developed
and still revolves around the notion of a sovereign king, his rights, and limits on his power.
Foucault, Two Lectures, supra note 15, at 94-95, 103.
188. See id. at 104-05 (explaining that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a new
mechanism of power, disciplinary power, replaced the juridical-political emphasis on a king's
power); Michael Mann, The Autonomous Power of the State, in Power in Modem Societies
314, 315-16 (Marvin E. Olsen & Martin N. Marger eds., 1993) (distinguishing despotic from
infrastructural power); cf Comell, supra note 118, at 122-23 (explaining that the constitutional protection of only negative liberties is based on social equality, where the state is the
primary threat to liberty).
189. Mann, supra note 188, at 315 (emphasis omitted); cf Foucault, Why Study Power,
supra note 15, at 213-16 (discussing how the modem western state exercises pastoral power).
Olsen and Marger write:
Despotic power is the power of the state to exert its will through the application of
coercion, primarily through military and police force. This type of power has
declined among states in modem societies, having been replaced by infrastructural
power. Infrastructural power is the state's power to coordinate and influence all
areas of social life, especially the distribution of economic resources, and at the same
time provide for the protection of life and property. In performing these functions,
the state becomes an increasingly centralized institution. Political authority rests with
a relatively small set of coordinated elites who are supported by complex and farreaching bureaucratic organizations.
Power in Modem Societies, supra note 188, at 251.
190. "Incontrast to the often sporadic, violent power over a relatively anonymous social
body exercised under older, monarchical forms of power, biopower emerges as an apparently
benevolent, but peculiarly invasive and effective form of social control." Sawicki, supra note
15, at 67.
191. Cf.Bourdieu & Wacquant, supra note 15, at 76 & n.16 (explaining that field of power
is field of forces).
192. SeeMann, supra note 188, at 315-16 (noting that in man),capitalist democracies, such
as the United States, the state's great infrastructural power gives it great despotic power over
marginal and minority groups, but little despotic power over dominant groups). According to
Foucault, an "ideology of right" is an ineffective protection against state power because it
developed to protect against a king's (juridical) power, not to protect against the disciplinary
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The infrastructural state, however, can muster the despotic power to
oppress religious outgroups, such as Jews. This realization underscores that
religious outgroups might benefit, at least to some degree, from the
separation of church and state. In the American democracy, the
overwhelmingly Christian majority largely controls the government, if only
because of sheer numbers. To the extent that the constitutional doctrine of
separation of church and state actually prevents the Christian-dominated
government from actively and directly conjoining with religion, then
Christianity cannot be imposed on members of outgroup religions through
the instrumentality of the government. And as Cohen's history of church
and state stresses, the courts do occasionally interpret the religion clauses
to prevent a conjuncture of Christianity and government. For example, in
Abington School District v. Schempp, the Court held that the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer in public schools is unconstitutional. 3 Likewise, in Edwards
v. Aguillard, the Court held that a state statute requiring public schools to
teach creation science whenever they taught the theory of evolution is
unconstitutional.1ee Nevertheless, while the separation of church and state
occasionally protects minority or outgroup religions, that protection often
dwindles into a limited, hypothetical, or even nonexistent refuge. In reality,
Christianity can be imposed on members of outgroup religions through
the instrumentality of the government so long as legal discourse labels or
codes the governmental action as secular. 5 Governmental actions that
are conducted in the guise of secularity can endorse, propagate, and
otherwise support Christianity because, from the perspective of
constitutional doctrine, the government has not impermissibly conjoined
9
with religion.9'
Derrick Bell's interest-convergence thesis helps explain why the
separation of church and state often provides only minimal benefits to
outgroup religions, such as Judaism: To a great extent, outgroup religions
benefit only when their interests happen to converge or correspond with
the interests of Christians. The benefits to outgroups, in other words, are
merely incidental, while the primaiy benefits of separation of church and

and pastoral power of the modem/postmodern state. See Foucault, Two Lectures, supra note
15, at 105-08.
193. 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). Cohen argues that Schempp was one of the key cases in
legitimating the secular public schools. Cohen, supra note 9, at 213.
194. 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1986).
195. See supra notes 132-54 and accompanying text (discussing the power of legal discourse
to label activities as secular). In Foucauldian terms, the juridical-political theory of sovereignity
tends to conceal power. See Barry Smart, Foucault, Marxism and Critique 85 (1983).
196. The code or guise of secularity, situated in the context of FirstAmendment discourse,
provides the background in which American Jews must live: American Jews operate within a
world where Christian activities and symbols are coded and potentially coded as secular. This
background tends to shape or influence the possibilities of American Jews for religious
freedom and for imagining that freedom. See generally Kennedy, supra note 15, at 120
(explaining how the law provides context for certain social interactions, such as those of the
economic marketplace).
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state flow, in fact, to Christianity, the hegemonically dominant religion in
America. Furthermore, while the accrual of primary benefits to Christianity
occasionally entails incidental benefits for outgroup religions, it also
frequently imposes certain costs on those outgroup religions. For instance
the principle of separation of church and state simultaneously benefits
Christianity and harms minority religions by furnishing a facade of
governmental neutrality and religious freedom that hides and legitimates
the Christian cultural imperialism that pulses through the American social
body.9 7 Indeed, the concept of neutrality that lies entrenched in the
separation of church and state forestalls considering seriously that the
religion clauses could be read to prohibit governmental commingling with
Christianity while nonetheless allowing governmental succor to outgroup
religions, which are otherwise subject to the hegemonic domination of
Christianity."'3
The Court recently faced this very problem and reacted predictably.
In Board of Education of Kisyas Joel Village School District v. Grumet,199 the

state of New York statutorily created a special school district following the
boundary lines of the Village of Kiryas Joel. All of the residents of the
Village belonged to a small Jewish sect, the Satmar Hasidim. The Satnars
sent most of their children to private religious schools, but these schools
were unable to provide adequate facilities for handicapped children. When
the Satmars initially sent these children to public schools in neighboring
communities, the children suffered "panic, fear, and trauma... in leaving

their own community and being with people whose ways were so
different."20 New York therefore created the special public school district
so that the Village could operate a publicly funded school for handicapped
children.0 The Court held, however, that the state violated the
Establishment Clause because the statute failed "the test of neutrality:an
State assistance of the Satmar Hasidim offended the "principle at the heart
of the Establishment Clause, that government should not prefer one
197. Seesupra notes 175-81 and accompanying text.
198. Without governmental protection and assistance, a religious outgrcup in America
resembles an unprotected individual confronted by the overwhelming power of a cartel in the
economic marketplace. Cf Berger, supra note 119, at 140-44 (discussing cartelization in
religion). Daniel Conkle argues that the Supreme Court should focus on the message or
effect of governmental actions on religious outsiders because insiders already are embraced
strongly by the community. Nonetheless, he simultaneously defends traditional or longstanding governmental practices, despite their offense to religious outsiders. See Daniel 0.
Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.L Rev. 1113, 117884 (1988) (discussing traditional governmental practices). Smith even criticizes Conkle's
somewhat attentuated suggestion that the Court emphasize the inclusion of religious
outsiders. Smith, supra note 8, at 114-15.
199. 114. Ct. 2481 (1994).
200. Id. at 2485 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Weder, 527 N.E.2d 767, 770 (N.Y. 1988)).
201. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985), and School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball,
473 US. 373, 384 (1985) had held previously that that publicly funded classes on religious
school premises violate the Establishment Clause.
202. Grumet, 114 S. Ct. at 2494 (emphasis added).
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religion to another, or religion to irreligion."2°s This reasoning
underscores the Court's refusal to recognize differences between the social
realities of mainstream Christians and outgroup sects such as the Satmar
Hasidim."4 To the Court, neutrality is the criterion for constitutionality,

yet in a hegemonically Christian society, such as America, "neutrality"
equals Christianity.
The link between neutrality and Christianity becomes even dearer
when Grumet is compared with Rosenberger v. Rectors and Visitors of the
University of Virginia.205 Once again emphasizing governmental neutrality,
the Rosenberger Court held that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit
the University of Virginia from funding an explicitly Christian magazine
created and run by students. 206 The Christian nature of the magazine was
undisputed; it expressly challenged "Christians to live, in word and deed,
according to the faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider
what a personal relationship with Jesus Christ means."" In dissent,
Justice Souter unequivocally characterized the magazine as evangelical
proselytization. 25" Nonetheless, the majority reasoned that the governmental action was neutral because the University funded other student activities
as well as the magazine. In fact, the Court stated that if the University
failed to fund the magazine, the University "could undermine the very
neutrality the Establishment Clause requires." 209 Thus, by ostensibly
enforcing governmental neutrality, the Court-first in Grumet and then in
Rosenbegavr-reinforced Christian hegemony.210 According to the Court,

203. Id. at 2491.
204. The Court wrote: "Here the benefit flows only to a single sect, but aiding this single,
small religious group causes no less a constitutional problem than would follow from aiding a
sect with more members or religion as a whole." Id. at 2492. Jeffrey Rosen argues, however,
that the Satmar Hasidim used coercive measures to maintain their own hegemonic position
within their small community. Jeffrey Rosen, "Village People," The New Republic, Apr. 11,
1994, at 11.
205. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
206. Id. at 2521-24.
207. Id. at 2515.
208. Id. at 2535, 2539 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the magazine was an
evangelical attempt to indoctrinate its readers).
209. Id. at 2525. More completely, the Court wrote:
To obey the Establishment Clause, it was not necessary for the University to deny
eligibility to student publications because of their viewpoint. The neutrality
commanded of the State by the separate Clauses of the First Amendment was
compromised by the University's course of action. The viewpoint discrimination
inherent in the University's regulation required public officials to scan and interpret
student publications to discern their underlying philosophic assumptions respecting
religious theory and belief That course of action was a denial of the right of free
speech and would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could
undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires.
Id. at 2524-25.
210. In his concurrence in Grumet, Justice Kennedy almost seems to understand this
outsider viewpoint. He wrote:
The Satmars' way of life, which springs out of their strict religious beliefs, conflicts in
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neutrality prohibited New York from creating a public school for the
handicapped children of a small and insularJewish sect, yet neutrality also
somehow required Virginia to fund a magazine devoted to Christian
proselytizing.
The Court's insistence on governmental neutrality supposedly
prevents the justices from expressly considering the orientation of power in
American society. To the Court, the Christian domination of America
should not explicitly affect the interpretation of the religion clauses--though, as I argue, the Christian domination of America implicitly or
unconsciously shapes the Court's understanding of the First Amendment.
Yet, because the Court refuses to expressly acknowledge Christian
domination, the justices readily equate Christian and Jewish symbols. For
example, the Court deems as constitutionally equivalent the governmental
displays of a creche and a Jewish menorah!" But, of course, the
governmental displays of a creche and a menorah do not carry equal
symbolic weights exactly because of the orientation of power in American
society-exactly because of Christian domination. Most broadly, the effect
or significance of a particular symbol-as a manifestation of power-depends partly on how it aligns with other contemporaneous forces or
manifestations of power. When a Jew sees a governmentally displayed
creche, he or she understands the creche within the context of Christian
imperialism. A Jew likely experiences the creche as having significant
symbolic weight because it is yet another affirmation of Christian power,
because it stands in a consistent line with other symbols and structures
establishing Christian domination. As such, the creche might readily cause
a Jew to feel humiliated, angry, speechless, excluded, or alienated. When,
on the other hand, a Christian sees a governmentally displayed menorah,
he or she probably experiences it quite differently.2 2 The menorah is not

many respects with mainstream American culture... [B]y creating the district, New
York did not impose or increase any burden on non-Satmars, compared to the
burden it lifted from the Satnars, that might disqualify the District as a genuine

accommodation.
Grunet, 114 S. Ct. at 2502 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Kennedy nonetheless concluded that the
statute ultimately violates the Establishment Clause. Id. at 2505.
211. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)
(failing to acknowledge that the government displays of a criche and a menorah might be
constitutionally distinct exactly because one symbol is Christian and one is Jewish). Even in his
dissent in Pinette, Justice Stevens went so far as to equate a Latin (Christian) cross with a
menorah. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440, 2470 (1995)
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
212. After the Supreme Court's decision upholding the governmental display of a criche
in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), Norman Redlich, Dean of New York University
Law School wrote: "When I see a government-supported criche, I suddenly feel as if I have
become a stranger in my own home, to be tolerated only as long as I accept dominant
religious values." Wayne R. Swanson, The Christ Child Goes to Court 173 (1990) (quoting
Norman Redlich, Nativity Ruling Insults Jews, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1984, sec. A). Pierre
Bourdieu talks of power as operating on a field that is the locus of various relations of force.
Bourdieu & Wacquant, supra note 15, at 96-104.
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aligned consistently with most other symbolic or structural manifestations
of power in American society. To the contrary, the governmental display of
a menorah conflicts with the usual symbolic and structural components of
Christian domination (except insofar as the menorah serves an ideological
function). Consequently, to a Christian, the potential symbolic power of
the menorah is neutralized; the menorah rarely carries significant force.
Many Christians, undoubtedly, will not even know what the menorah is or
what it stands for. Put in simple terms, a Christian child who occasionally
sees a menorah is not going to come home and ask her parents if they can
celebrate Chanukah or become Jewish. But a Jewish child who constantly is
exposed to Christmas displays and constantly told about Christmas is, quite
possibly, going to come home at some point and ask for a Christmas tree
or even a full celebration of Christmas. In American society, there is a
difference between being Christian and Jewish. Yet the Court steadfastly
ignores this difference by claiming to insist upon governmental neutrality,
and in so doing, the Court contributes to the reproduction of Christian
domination.
In sum, constitutional principles such as the separation of church and
state can arise from a cauldron of political and social interests, but those
23
interests then constitute the elemental components of the principle.
Even if such a principle eventually becomes a causal factor within society,
the principle retains its elemental components, albeit altered in form, and
thus seldom acutely contravenes the interests that engendered it.
Consequently, in the context of American society, the principle of
separation of church and state should be understood as a political
development that primarily benefits the dominant religion, Christianity.
Benefits occasionally flow to outgroup religions, but those benefits typically
are incidental, not primary. Moreover, the separation of church and state
sometimes disadvantages outgroup religions in distinct ways. Before
concluding, I will discuss three additional ways in which the ostensible
principle of separation of church and214state benefits Christianity and harms
minority religions, including Judaism.
First, the principle of separation of church and state increases the
likelihood that Christian-oriented governmental action will be labeled or
coded as secular and therefore legitimated. That is, the very existence of
the separation of church and state as a constitutional principle tends to
reify the state as a secular organ or instrumentality. Because the separation
of church and state supposedly stands as a foundational principle of our
governmental system, most individuals tend to presume that any action

213. To be dear, I do not mean to suggest that individuals feel motivated only by the
pursuit of self-interest. Individual motivations are much more complex. See Stephen M.
Feldman, 'Whose Common Good? Racism in the Political Community, 80 Geo. Lj. 1835
(1992) (contrasting self-interest with other motivations).
214. Cf. Kennedy, supra note 15, at 136-38 (asserting that many consequences flow from
having a legal system that condemns sexual abuse in the abstract while allowing and tolerating
many instances of abuse).

81

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[1996]

taken by the government is, of course, secular (merely because it is
governmental action, and the government is, by definition, secular). In
other words, governmental action is presumptively secular and therefore
consistent with the constitutional principle of separation of church and
state exactly because it is governmental action. For example, in Marsh v.
Chambers,215 the Court relied on a tradition of governmental action to
justify holding that a state legislature could constitutionally open each day
with a prayer from a publicly paid chaplain. The Court wrote:
The opening of sessions of legislative and other deliberative
public bodies with prayer is deeply embedded in the history and
tradition of this country. From colonial times through the
founding of the Republic and ever since, the practice of
legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and religious freedom. In the very courtrooms in which the
United States District Judge and later three Circuit Judges heard
and decided this case, the proceedings opened with an
announcement that concluded, "God save the United States and
this Honorable Court." The same invocation occurs at all sessions
of this Court.16
The Court suggested, in other words, that the mere fact the government
traditionally had performed or sponsored a particular activity might render
that activity secular (or at least not an establishment of religion). In Marsh,
then, the Court found it irrelevant that a single Christian minister had
served as the state chaplain for sixteen consecutive years
21 and that his
prayers occasionally had referred expressly to Jesus Christ.
A second way in which the ostensible principle of separation of
church and state benefits Christianity and harms outgroup religions stems
from the need of cultural traditions to reproduce themselves. 218 The
constitutional discourse of the religion clauses tends to constantly
reconstruct and inflate the importance of the principle of separation of
church and state, which in turn reinforces Christian cultural imperialism.
In particular, whenever any incidental benefit is afforded to a religious
outgroup, Americans can pound their chests and boast about the
significance of the First Amendment. By magnifying the importance of the
incidental benefits flowing to Jews and other outgroups, constitutional
rhetoric sustains and even invigorates the dominant story of the separation
of church and state as a great principle protecting religious freedom. Thus,
the constitutional discourse of the dominant story bolsters the dominant
215.
216.
217.
Jewish

463 U.S. 783 (1983).
Id. at 786.
See id. at 785, 793 n.14 (noting the minister removed all references to Christ after a
legislator complained). It is at least worth noting that in Marsh the Court relied on

tradition to uphold the constitutionality of a religiously oriented governmental practice, but in

McGowan and Braunfel4 see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text, the Court reasoned
that the recent secularization of Sunday dosing laws overcame their clear historical roots in
Christianity. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 431-35.
218. See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
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If cultural traditions need to reproduce themselves to remain
story21itself.
vital, 9 then the tradition of church and state assiduously gratifies this
internal need.
Third, the incidental benefits flowing to religious outgroups
contribute to the social construction of American Jews. In short, Christians
are not the only Americans to boast about the significance of the First
Amendment. Although Christian domination is, to a great extent, imposed
upon American Jews, Jews also frequently acquiesce in Christian cultural
imperialism because, in part, of the separation of church and state. The First
Amendment appears to protect and occasionally does protect Jews from
governmental oppression, which historically has been conspicuous, though
sporadic; the Holocaust is an ominous reminder of the grim potential for
state-imposed persecution. Because of this apparent protection from such
egregious impositions of state power, American Jews often support and
even celebrate the separation of church and state; indeed, Cohen
underscores that Jews strongly advocated for the separation of church and
state throughout American history.no But in their avid support for strict
separation, many Jews fail to perceive the more insidious contemporary
danger-Christian cultural imperialism-that lurks within the American
social body.nl Thus, the American Jew is "normalized": He or she
becomes an American, like any other (Christian) American, only with a
different religion (which is a purely private matter, anyway). And as an
American, he or she of course celebrates the extraordinary protection of
religious liberty that all Americans enjoy.2

219. See id.
220. As Leo Pfeffer notes, throughout most of Jewish history, "there was no line between
the religious and the secular." Pfeffer, supra note 7, at 8.
221. Cf Sawicki, supra note 15, at 64 (stating that a disciplinary technology can subjugate
more readily because it also enhances power). Sawicki wrote about the social construction of
women:
Foucault's model of power [shows how] technologies subjugate by developing
competencies, not simply by taking power away.... [Olne reason such technologies
are so effective is that they involve the acquisition of skills, and are associated with a
central component of feminine identity, namely, sexuality. The disciplines enhance

the power of the subject while simultaneously subjugating her. Hence, women
become attached to them and regard feminist critiques of the feminine aesthetic as a
threat.
Id.
222. In effect, then, American Jews acquiesce to an exchange: The threat of overt and
flagrant governmental conjunction with religion is traded for the tacit Christian cultural
imperialism imposed by supposedly secular, private, and legitimate social practices.
Sawicki wrote about normalization and patriarchy.
[An] emphasis on normalization as opposed to violence represents a major
advantage of the disciplinary model of power. If patriarchal power operated primarily
through violence, objectification and repression, why would women subject
themselves to it willingly? On the other hand, if it also operates by inciting desire,

attaching individuals to specific identities, and addressing real needs, then it is easier
to understand how it has been so effective at getting a grip on us.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Although American Jews acquiesce in Christian cultural imperialism
to some extent, one should not overlook that Jews also resist Christian
domination in many ways-sometimes by merely remaining Jewish. In
America, where Christianity is so ubiquitous and firmly embedded as to
appear neutral and natural, separation from the normalized Christian
order of the social world can produce a type of existential amdety or even
terrorf" Yet, the only alternative for American Jews is submission to the
final step of Christian hegemonic domination, the elimination of the
Jewish subculture. Furthermore, although many American Jews accept and
support the separation of church and state, they never just choose to do so;
4
rather, they are always in part compelled.22 Many Jews who publicly
acquiesce in and even celebrate the principle of separation of church and
state might harbor a "hidden transcript," a discourse of resistance and
opposition expressed primarily to other Jews or outgroup members.2 To
these Jews, a more open or public statement of resistance seems impolitic
or even dangerous. From this perspective, seeking judicial enforcement of
the strict separation of church and state may not be ideal, but it offers the

Id. at 85.
223. To go from a position of inclusion to exclusion resembles crossing from a "safe circle
Into wilderness." Williams, supra note 88, at 129. Hence, for example, many Jews in
nineteenth century Europe were tempted to seek inclusion in the dominant social order by
converting to Christianity, not because of religious faith, but because, in the words of the
German author, Heinrich Heine, "[the baptismal certificate [was] the ticket of admission to
European culture." Heinrich Heine, A Ticket of Admission to European Culture, rqerinfed in
The Jew in the Modem World: A Documentary History 223, 223 (Paul R. Mendes-Flohr &
Jehuda Reinharz eds., 1980).
224. Kimberle Crenshaw wrote: "Black people do not create their oppressive worlds
moment to moment but rather are coerced into living in worlds created and maintained by
others. Moreover, the ideological source of this coercion is... racism." Kimberle Crenshaw,
Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination
Law, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331, 1357 (1988); cf.Kennedy, supra note 15, at 151 (discussing ways
In which men enforce traditional identities on women).
225. See, e.g., Scott, supra note 15, at 25. Scott wrote:
If subordinate discourse in the presence of the dominant is a public transcript,
I shall use the term hidden transcript to characterize discourse that takes place
"offstage," beyond direct observation by powerholders. The hidden transcript is thus
derivative in the sense that it consists of those offstage speeches, gestures, and
practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect what appears in the public transcript.
We do not wish to prejudge, by definition, the relation between what is said in the
face of power and what is said behind its back. Power relations are not, alas, so
straightforward that we can call what is said in power-laden contexts false and what is
said offstage true. Nor can we simplistically describe the former as a. realm of
necessity and the latter as a realm of freedom What is certainly the case, however, is
that the hidden transcript is produced for a different audience and under different
constraints of power than the public transcript. By assessing the discrepancy between
the hidden transcript and the public transcript we may begin to judge the impact of
domination on public discourse.
Id. at 4-5.
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best possible means for opposing Christian cultural imperialism within the
perceived political realities of America.
In a sense, the Jewish position on separation of church and state in
Christian America represents a structured predicament: A dilemma
produced in part by the American Jewish position or role in society and
history. As noted, some Jews might advocate strict separation of church and
state, not because it would be their choice in an ideal world, but rather
because they are resigned to working within certain perceived political
constraints. This structured predicament, though, can be further
elaborated: The American Jewish commitment to separation of church and
state reflects, in a rather odd way, a historical tendency for Jewish
communities to embrace or commit to the state. Throughout Western
history, not just American history, Jews often have turned to the state for
protection against the Christian masses (and mobs). For instance, during
the fourteenth century, Christians accused Jews of causing the Bubonic
Plague by poisoning water supplies. Individual Jews were tortured until
they confessed to the crime, and then entire Jewish populations were
burned in retribution. In such circumstances, Jews often turned to
governmental officials for defense from the Christian mobs.ns
In America, Jews again have turned to the state for support and
protection from the Christian masses,2 but because America is a
democracy, this turn has produced a paradox. To a great degree, Jews have
looked to the state for protection from the state itself-that is, from the
Christian masses acting through the instrumentality of the state. More
precisely, Jews have sought the protection of the state through the
institution of the judiciary, with the courts protecting Jews from the reach
of the more political branches of government, which are largely controlled
by the Christian majority.2s The means used by the courts to protectJews
from political overreaching is, of course, the constitutional principle of
separation of church and state. Hence, Jews embrace the state-as
embodied in the courts--to enforce the principle of separation of church
and state, in order to be protected from the Christian masses who
democratically control the state-as embodied in the legislative and
executive branches.
Frequently in Western history, when Jews have turned to a state for

226. See A Source Book, supra note 127, at 43-47 (providing a detailed account of the
persecution of StrasburgJews during the outbreak of the Black Plague in 1348-1349); see also
Johnson, supra note 26, at 250-51 (noting kings protected Jews in Poland during the late
sixteenth century).
227. See Ginsberg, supra note 68, at 197 (noting that alliances and opportunities with
national and state governments enabledJews to combat religious threats).
228. I do not mean to suggest thatJews have not also sought the embrace of the executive
and legislative branches of the federal government. See id. at 97-144 (discussing the political
empowerment of Jews beginning with the New Deal); see also Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal
Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America 158-230 (1976) (describing the
reactions of the legal professional elite to Jewish attorneys participating in the New Deal).
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protection, governmental officials provided the desired refuge, but usually
only so long as it remained in their own interest to do so.229 If a
governmental official perceived that further protection of Jews might
threaten his or her economic or political stability, then the official typically
sacrificed Jewish subjects to placate the mob. 29 Benjamin Ginsberg,
therefore, refers to the Jewish tendency to rely on the state as a "fatal
embrace" because it so often ended in disaster.23' Significantly, Ginsberg
argues that the American Jewish embrace of the state (manifested largely
in judicial protection) has begun to sour: Even overt public antisemitism,
which nearly had disappeared, has begun to reemerge as a potent political
force. 2 2 The Anti-Defamation League's 1992 Audit of Anti-Semitic
Incidents concludes that approximately fifty million Americans hold
"strong" antisemitic beliefs.2 13 Worse still, these Americans "qualified" as
strongly antisemitic only by answering affirmatively to at least six out of
eleven questions that tested for overt antisemitism, such as whether Jews are
more willing than others to use shady practices to get ahead. m Many
more Americans answered one or more of these questions affirmatively
without reaching the number needed to qualify as strongly antisemitic. For
example, approximately 77.5 million Americans believe that Jews have too
much power in the United States.!
Nonetheless, as Cohen and others have correctly observed,
antisemitism diminished in America after World War II.2
The
significance of this reduction, though, is easily misinterpreted. First, while
overt antisemitism has decreased dramatically, the linguistic and structural
components of Christian hegemony have remained largely in place.
Second, because these underlying components remain extant but obscure,
Cohen overestimates the permanence of the reduction in antisemitism. In
contrast to Ginsberg, Cohen neglects the historical tendency of

229. In 1321, the King of France demanded 150,000 pounds from Jews accused of

poisoning water supplies. Syrian, supra note 127, at 129-30; see asoJohnson, supra note 26, at
243 (noting that during the Reformation in Germany, Catholic emperors and princes found
Jews to be useful allies against Protestants).
230. Bauman, supra note 25, at 50-51.
231. Ginsberg, supra note 68, at 224.
232. Id. Ginsberg discussed various public figures, such as James Baker, Pat Buchanan,
David Duke, Pat Robertson, and Kirk Fordice, who have uttered expressly antisenitic
statements. Id. at 223-35.
233. Anti-Defamation League, 1992 Audit of Anti-Semitic Incidents 1 (1993) [hereinafter
1992 Audit].
234. Telephone Interview with Alan Schwartz, Director of Research, Anti-Defamation
League, New York Office (Apr. 5, 1994); see Quinley & Glock, supra note 25, at 1-20
(discussing the method of testing for antisemitism).
235. See 1992 Audit, supra note 233, at 1. The Anti-Defamation League does not report on
the number of Americans who harbor antisemitic attitudes but do not express them overtly
either because of social etiquette or because their antisemitism operates primarily at an
unconscious or unintentional level. For a brief discussion of hidden and latent antisemitism,
see Tom W. Smith, Anti-Semitism in Contemporary America 19-22 (1994).
236. Cohen, supra note 9, at 123.
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antisemitism to ebb and flow. Third, in analyzing the postwar reduction in
antisemitism, Cohen probably attributes too much importance to the
Supreme Court and its enforcement of the constitutional principle of
separation of church and state. In previous historical instances, state
protection of Jews usually reflected a propitious and temporary
convergence of interests between the Jewish community and governmental
officials. Similarly, the postwar reduction in antisemitism might be
attributed to several factors besides the judicial resolve to protect religious
outgroups. For example, during the 1920s, changes in the immigration
laws sharply curtailed Jewish immigration.237 As the Jews already in the
United States increasingly assimilated into the Christian culture during the
1950s, they provoked less of the open hostility characteristic of earlier eras.
More important, after World War II, overt antisemitism resounded too
closely with the violence of the Holocaust and thus became socially
embarrassing; for their own psychological well-being, Americans needed to
differentiate themselves sharply from Germans.2
Meanwhile, Smith might be correct insofar as he perceives some
Christian backlash against Supreme Court protection of Jews through the
constitutional principle of separation of church and state. Yet, he
incorrectly believes that this backlash can be corrected by paying closer
attention to originalist history and theoretical precision; he ignores the
societal and historical context in which this fatal embrace has unfolded.
Smith's unstudied suggestion that outgroup religions, including American
Jews, would do better without judicial enforcement of the separation of
church and state reveals his failure to understand (or even consider) the
American Jewish predicament.
To be sure, I am not arguing that American Jews and other religious
outgroups would be better off without the separation of church and state. I
do maintain, though, that the dominant story of church and state tends

simultaneously to overstate the benefits and to deny the costs to Jews and
other outgroups. In a democratic nation overwhelmingly dominated by
237. See Wistrich, supra note 25, at 117-18 (noting that the mass immigration of Russian
Jews in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries inflamed antisemitism, leading to the
passage of the racist immigration law of 1924); see also Congressional Committee on
Immigration, Temporary Suspension of Immigration, H.R. 1109, 66th Cong., 3rd Sess. (1920),
reprinted in The Jew in the Modem World, supra note 223, at 405 (lamenting the large
numbers of Jewish immigrants arriving shortly after World War I, and therefore calling for a
total suspension on immigration into the United States); Richard D. Breitman & Alan M.
Kraut, Anti-Semitism in the State Department, 1933-44: Four Case Studies, inAnti-Semitism in
American History 167 (David A. Gerber ed., 1986) (focusing on individuals within the pre-war
and World War II State Department, which had a general consensus of opposing the
loosening of immigration restrictions that would have saved European Jews).
238. Likewise, as Derrick Bell and others have argued, several factors contributed to a
postwar reduction in racism. For instance, overt racism hindered the nation's efforts to woo
Third World countries during the Cold War and interfered with economic development,
especially in the South. Bell, supra note 185; Dudziak, supra note 185. Insofar as antisemitism
is a form of racism, the reduction in racism contributed to a reduction in antisemitism.
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Christians, Jews stand in a precarious and paradoxical position. As
Ginsberg observes, "Jews are trapped by the logic and structure of their
situation."" 9 To advocate for the strict separation of church and state
presents insidious harms, yet to stand by idly while Christians use the
government to impose their religion and culture seems near-suicidal. For
better or worse,
American Jews remain ensnared in "a dilemma that has no
24 0
solution."

239.
240.

Ginsberg, supra note 68, at 58.
Id.

